One Arizona Evaluation Study by Shiree Teng
ONE ARIZONA Evaluation Report | June 2016    1 Evaluation Study | June 2016
2   ONE ARIZONA Evaluation Report | June 2016
One Arizona Evaluation Study
Principal Evaluation Team:
Shiree Teng and Tom Wong
June 2016
CONTENTS
 2    Executive Summary
 4     Introduction
 6     Part 1:  Context and Formation of 
One Arizona
21    Part 2: Voter Engagement, Turnout, 
and PEVL Data Summary
40   Looking Forward
54   Appendix 1: Complete Voter 
Engagement, Turnout, and PEVL Data
81    Appendix 2: One Arizona Theory 
of Change
2   ONE ARIZONA Evaluation Report | June 2016
In 2010, Arizona was ground zero for 
anti-immigrant sentiment and legislation, 
drawing national and even international 
headlines for SB 1070, the “show me your 
papers” law. Activists responded to form the 
nonpartisan One Arizona, aimed at promoting 
full electoral participation of Latino citizens, 
especially infrequent and first-time voters. 
Three years later, the coalition expanded to 
target young citizens and unmarried women 
while continuing to focus on voter registration, 
voter mobilization, and election protection. 
How successful have One Arizona’s efforts 
been to date, and where should it look in the 
future? This evaluation study aims to answer 
that question by drawing on 28 structured 
one-on-one key stakeholder interviews and 
a statistical analysis of five years of voter 
engagement and turnout results. It’s also 
important to look back at the deep roots of 
the current climate for Latinos in Arizona, 
stretching back to the politically charged 
history of Mexican-American civic and political 
incorporation into the United States, and the 
disenfranchisement and racism that followed 
in the Southwest.
In the wake of SB 1070, ten community 
organizations—Arizona Advocacy Network 
(AZAN), Arizona Center for Empowerment 
(ACE), Border Action Network (BAN), Central 
Arizonans for a Sustainable Economy (CASE), 
Democracia USA (DUSA), Mi Familia Vota 
(MFV), Promise Arizona (PAZ), Protecting 
Arizona’s Family Coalition (PAFCO), Puente 
Arizona (Puente),  and Southwest Conference 
of United Church of Christ (UCC)—came 
together to form One Arizona, agreeing on 
a collaborative pact to ensure accountability 
and leverage the best from each community 
partner to increase civic engagement, 
power, and safety for the state’s vulnerable 
Latino and immigrant communities. The 
new coalition, with initial seed funding from 
Four Freedoms Fund and later Unbound 
Philanthropy, was able to help the groups 
move beyond an unhealthy and competitive 
relationship to create a collaborative united 
movement focused on increasing Latino voter 
engagement, turnout, and power.
Seven core ingredients have 
allowed the One Arizona table to 
endure and remain effective:
1. Implementing nonpartisan year-round 
voter engagement strategies;
2. Staying focused on expanding the Latino 
electorate and increasing Latino power;
3. Serving as a neutral space where different 
roles and strategies are respected;
4. Establishing clear accountability 
mechanisms that bring order and 
structure;
5. Having funder partnerships that add value 
beyond grant dollars, including brokering 
timely, high-quality, and strategic 
capacity-building support;
6. Using data to inform and adjust field 
strategies; and
7. Staying on course to build long-term 
sustainable political power.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Most importantly, One Arizona’s efforts are 
changing the way Latino and other citizens 
view democracy and take part in it. Its work has 
helped encourage, train, and develop a broad 
number of young activists, creating a new, 
committed generation of leadership. In only 
a few years, the coalition has grown a vibrant, 
organic garden of capable leaders, giving them 
voice, methodology, and a tangible community. 
Results prove effectiveness: A detailed year-by-
year analysis of voter data reveals that, as hoped, 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts—more 
than three million attempted voter engagements 
or contacts between 2010 and 2015—have 
consistently increased turnout, particularly among 
low-propensity Latino voters. Latino voters are 
overrepresented among demographic groups 
with lower voter turnout—those who are young, 
poorer, and with less formal education. 
By moving away from robocalls and toward door-
to-door canvassing, the table has seen marked 
increases in both even-year federal elections (e.g., 
the 2010 midterm general election) and odd-
year municipal elections (e.g., the 2011 municipal 
elections in Phoenix). In addition to its impact 
on voter turnout, the coalition has changed the 
way that citizens vote by increasing the number 
of low-propensity Latino and New American 
Majority voters who are on the Permanent Early 
Voter List (PEVL). This increase of PEVL for Latinos 
that have not voted on a regular basis is critical by 
making voting more convenient and accessible.
Out of all outreach attempts during 2010–15, 
One Arizona activists made more than a million 
successful voter contacts, a contact rate of 35 
percent, as well as engaging or successfully 
contacting some 117,000 unique voters—three-
quarters of them Latino—regarding vote-by-
mail and/or early voting (asking eligible Latino 
voters to sign up for PEVL, or encouraging 
those already signed up for PEVL to actually 
vote). Overall, One Arizona has used vote-by-
mail to address obstacles to voting for nearly 
50,000 low-propensity Latino voters.
Moving forward, we offer the 
following considerations for the 
coalition and its stakeholders:
• Pay attention to strengthening One 
Arizona’s internal capacity;
• Be very deliberate about expanding the 
Latino electorate while growing to include 
other New American Majority populations;
• Carefully test a proactive policy agenda as 
not to lose the civic-engagement big tent;
• Spark excitement by being more creative in 
engaging voters;
• Build and strengthen a leadership-
development ladder;
• Expand to more parts of the state 
methodically;
• Pay attention to building the capacity of 
partner organizations, especially those 
more nascent;
• Leverage existing partnerships to advance 
civic engagement in schools; and
• For funders, recognize the importance of 
continued and consistent support.
Arizona is well on its way to becoming a 
majority-minority state. The Latino population is
growing rapidly, and this growth represents an
unprecedented opportunity to transform the 
state’s policies and priorities. If SB 1070 has taught
Latinos anything, it’s that civic engagement 
matters greatly—and that a coalition such as One 
Arizona can transform the state’s civic environment 
to be more inclusive for Latinos and for all 
Arizonians. But significant resources are needed 
if the Latino vote is to achieve its promise.
“For me, One Arizona 
moved people from 
fear to hope, from 
desperation to 
intentionality, from 
despair to courage.” 
-One Arizona founding partner
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1. Introduction
After the state legislature passed the anti-
immigrant SB 1070, ten nonprofit organizations 
—ACE, AZAN, BAN, CASE, DUSA, MFV, 
PAZ, Puente, Southwest Conference UCC 
and PAFCO—banded together to form the 
nonpartisan One Arizona, aimed at promoting 
full electoral participation of Latino citizens, 
especially infrequent and first-time voters. 
Our communities have come to trust us to fight 
for them and demystify the very confusing 
process. A lot of times, we will knock on doors, 
and people will say, “I don’t even know how to 
fill out a voter registration form. I am so glad 
you came to help me figure this out. 
–One Arizona community partner 
In 2013, One Arizona expanded its constituent 
group to include the New American Majority, 
defined as citizens ages 18–30 and unmarried 
women. One Arizona continues to focus on 
voter registration, voter mobilization, and 
election protection. 
After five years of continued funding, One 
Arizona’s two leading funders—Unbound 
Philanthropy and the Four Freedoms Fund—
commissioned this study and evaluation 
of One Arizona, seeking to document One 
Arizona’s accomplishments, assess the 
partnership’s impact on the state’s pro-
immigrant movement, and reflect on lessons 
learned from the One Arizona experience 
to (1) inform future 501(c)(3) investments 
in civic participation in Arizona and other 
states and (2) inform and strengthen the 
effectiveness of its future activities.
The existence of One Arizona and its 
commitment to having organizations that 
represent the rights of working people and 
immigrants in the state have added to 
the fabric of power for families. It can’t 
be discounted. They’ve helped build an 
infrastructure that advances the vehicle of 
participation in the state.
–Immigrant-rights ally
ONE ARIZONA Evaluation Report | June 2016    5 
This evaluation study contains three main 
parts. The first section offers a sociopolitical 
historical context, followed by the story 
of One Arizona’s formation, and, using 
perspectives of stakeholders drawn from 
interviews, locates the key ingredients that 
were present in the collaborative for it to 
survive, thrive, and succeed. 
The second section examines the outcomes 
of One Arizona’s work, containing both 
quantitative and qualitative data. This section 
imparts a quantitative analysis of the last 
five years of One Arizona’s voter registration 
and turnout efforts as well as the most 
meaningful ways to measure impact. 
The third and final section looks forward
and highlights key considerations and 
recommendations for One Arizona’s next 
five years. 
2. Methodology
Two bodies of unique research, one 
quantitative and the other qualitative, 
supported this effort. We conducted 28 
structured one-on-one interviews with 
key stakeholders: thirteen One Arizona 
members, including six founding members; 
six allies in the immigrant rights field; 
three elected officials; five funders; and 
one capacity builder. There were also 
meetings with One Arizona’s executive 
committee and staff, and a focus group 
with a dozen participants, as well as a 
review of documents and reports regarding 
the table’s work. Interviews took place 
between January and March 2016. The 
evaluation team also documented One 
Arizona’s theory of change, which outlined 
its assumptions, vision, strategies, and 
the short- and long-term outcomes that 
guided the evaluation inquiry. 
Accompanying the qualitative study, Tom 
K. Wong, assistant professor of political 
science at the University of California, San 
Diego, conducted a statistical analysis of 
five years of voter engagement strategies 
and turnout results, with a year-by-year 
analysis of One Arizona’s various activities. 
The top lines of the voter data and analysis 
are included here; the detailed voter data 
report is attached as an appendix.
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Context and Formation 
of One Arizona
PART ONE:
Background and 
Political Context
Early History of Mexicans in Arizona
The current climate for Latinos in Arizona has 
deep roots, stretching back to the politically 
charged history of Mexican-American civic 
and political incorporation into the United 
States. The signing of the 1848 Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo marked the end of the 
Mexican-American War—at the time, the 
bloodiest and costliest war in American 
history1—and established a new border 
between the two nations, ceding to the 
United States one-third of Mexico’s territory. 
Comprising all or part of what was to become 
ten separate states (Texas, California, Nevada, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah Wyoming, Colorado, 
New Mexico, and Arizona), the land Mexico 
ceded was greater in size than the nations of 
Germany and France combined. Even more 
significantly, this early history of war, conquest, 
and annexation had a powerful impact on 
how Latinos were initially incorporated into 
what was to become the American Southwest. 
As historian David Gutiérrez observes, “in 
the half century following the annexation 
of Mexico’s former northern provinces, the 
ethnic Mexican population of the region was 
slowly but surely relegated to an inferior, 
caste-like status.… Mexicans were gradually 
divested of both political and economic 
influence.2… By the turn of the century most 
Mexican Americans found themselves in a 
position in society not much better than that 
occupied by Indians and African Americans 
elsewhere in the United States.”3 
Arizona was part of Mexico long before, so 
there was a native Latino population, and then 
immigrants came from California for cheaper 
costs of living. A power structure of ranchers 
and miners became entrenched, and there 
was a backlash against immigrants—a mass 
perception that Latinos can’t vote. White folks 
didn’t differentiate Latinos who are voters from 
undocumented immigrants here a year.
–One Arizona partner
1. David G. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity (University of 
California, 1995), p. 13.
2. The exception to this drastic loss of political and economic influence was northern New Mexico and south Texas, where Mexi-
can-Americans continued to hold large numerical majorities until the late nineteenth century. See Walls and Mirrors, p. 14.
3. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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This experience of economic displacement, 
racialization, and prejudice was certainly 
present in Arizona, where Mexican-Americans 
lost ranches and family farms throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as 
the transcontinental railroad allowed financial 
interests from the East Coast and Western 
Europe to convert and export the state’s 
natural resources. The period between the 
arrival of the railroads and World War II marked 
Arizona’s “extractive period,” historian Thomas 
Sheridan notes, in which “the railroads, copper 
companies, cotton farmers, and ranchers 
dominated Arizona politics and pitted ‘Mexican’ 
and ‘Anglo’ workers against one another to 
break up unions and keep wages down.”4 
As soon as they got all the ore out of the 
mountains and didn’t need immigrant 
labor, they deported them. That’s 
the pattern here. It happened with 
farmworkers, in the lettuce capital in 
Yuma County, all of the workers were 
from across the border: Let’s invite them 
in to do the mining, harvesting, grow our 
crops, build our houses. When the economy 
tanks, they get beat up and seen as taking 
too much health care and school resources, 
committing crime, raping our women, 
killing our officials.
–One Arizona founding partner
4. Thomas Sheridan, Arizona: A History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012). See also Beloved Land: An Oral History of 
Mexican Americans in Southern Arizona, edited by Patricia Preciado Martin (University of Arizona Press, 2004).
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This history of scapegoating and racial 
exclusion continued into the early years 
of the Great Depression, when much of 
Arizona’s Anglo population, “including labor 
union members and state officials, placed 
the blame for skyrocketing unemployment 
and low wages on ‘alien’ Mexican workers.”5 
In their efforts to protect the status of 
“white citizen workers,” Arizona unions and 
politicians pressured the U.S. Department 
of Labor to “restrict immigration and initiate 
a nationwide ‘repatriation’ campaign during 
which some half million Mexican immigrants, 
and thousands of Mexican Americans, were 
deported.”6 In sum, despite being indigenous 
to the Southwest, Mexicans in Arizona have a 
long history of being perceived as “foreign” 
regardless of the time and mode of their 
incorporation into the United States or their 
subsequent status as citizens of this nation.7 
This early history of Latinos often being perceived 
as an economic and racial threat has continued 
to shape the context for Latino politics 
and community organizing in Arizona, the 
Southwest, and throughout the United States.8 
A Reputation for Extremism: 
Barry Goldwater, Sheriff Joe, and 
Donald Trump 
Barry Goldwater, running for president 
in 1964, launched the rise of the modern 
conservative movement from his U.S. 
Senate seat, and his far-right views set 
the tone for Arizona politics. Moreover, as 
retirees (“snowbirds”) began flowing into 
Phoenix and other cities, conflicts between 
the state’s distinct populations became 
increasingly heated—and visible—as Arizona 
began developing an unwelcome reputation 
as a site of extremism and intolerance. 
In 1972, Gov. Jack Williams signed a bill 
barring farmworkers from striking and 
boycotting during harvest season; when 
the United Farm Workers protested, he 
remarked, “As far as I’m concerned, those 
people don’t exist.”9 In 1987, Gov. Evan 
Mecham put the state in the national 
spotlight by canceling the paid Martin 
Luther King Jr. holiday and was removed 
from office following conviction in his 
impeachment trial of charges of the 
obstruction of justice and the misuse of 
government funds (inspiring Public Enemy’s 
furious “By the Time I Get to Arizona”).
Raising temperatures across the board, in 
1992, Maricopa County voters elected Joe 
Arpaio as sheriff, and the self-declared 
“America’s Toughest Sheriff” has been one 
of the state’s most prominent political figures 
ever since. Even as strong dissent persisted, 
this impression of Arpaio set in, reinforced by 
periodic flare-ups, usually with racial issues at 
the center.
In 2005, Arizona became the nation’s 
epicenter of anti-immigrant rhetoric and 
policy when Sheriff Arpaio—by now this 
generation’s Bull Connor, the national 
5.  Eric V. Meeks, “Protecting the ‘White Citizen Worker’: Race, Labor, and Citizenship in South-Central Arizona, 1929-1945,” 
Journal of the Southwest 48(1), Spring 2006, p. 93.
6. Ibid., p. 91. 
7.  See Suzanne Oboler, Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of Re(Presentation in the United States (University 
of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 17-18 and Cristina Beltrán, The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 7. 
8. For more on this concept of Latinos as a racial threat, see Leo R. Chavez, The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citi-
zens, and the Nation (Stanford University Press, 2008).
9. United Farm Workers, “¡History of Si Se Puede!”, www.ufw.org/_board.php?mode=view&b_code=cc_his_research&b_no=5970.
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face of anti-immigrant sentiment—began 
loudly promoting his department’s 
aggressive practices targeting suspected 
undocumented immigrants, as well as his 
extreme, and TV-ready, punishments for 
suspects and convicts alike. The same year, a 
loose confederation of armed citizens calling 
themselves Minutemen drew attention by 
engaging in vigilante border patrols that 
called for “hunting down” migrants.10
I started organizing professionally in 2003. For 
the next five years, we got our asses handed to 
us. In 2008, a handful of people sat back and 
said, “We don’t think we know how to fight 
this fight.”
–One Arizona community partner
In 2004, Arizona voters passed Proposition 
200, requiring individuals to produce proof 
of citizenship before registering to vote 
or applying for public benefits. Proof of 
citizenship included a state driver’s license 
issued on or after October 1, 1996, the date 
from which Arizona licenses were required 
to contain social security numbers.
“There were 
successive 
attacks. 
Proposition 200 
was the first, and 
when they got 
away with that, 
they launched 
anti-immigrant 
strategies 
nationwide.
When they 
couldn’t win 
nationally, 
they turned to a 
local strategy, 
picking off little 
things: making it 
illegal to rent to 
undocumented, 
taking away 
bail and bond 
rights—things that 
chip away at the 
quality of life of 
Latino immigrant 
communities.”
10. Carla Marinucci and Mark Martin, “Governor endorses Minutemen on border,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 29, 2005, 
www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Governor-endorses-Minutemen-on-border-He-parts-2685866.php
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The climax came in April 2010, when Gov. 
Jan Brewer signed SB 1070, at that time the 
country’s strictest anti-immigration bill, which 
notoriously granted police officers power 
to detain anyone they suspected of illegally 
being in the country. The Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
predicted that the law would create “a spiral of 
pervasive fear, community distrust, increased 
crime and costly litigation, with nationwide 
repercussions.”11 The state legislature followed 
SB 1070 the next month by pushing through 
a bill aiming to ban ethnic studies in state 
schools, written specifically to target the 
Tucson system’s Chicano-studies program.12 
Before One Arizona, Latinos had no political 
power. We were underrepresented in the 
statehouse and legislature, and this allowed SB 
1070 to be pushed through the legislature. It 
remains a bleak landscape, with no Democrat 
or Latino elected to statewide office. 
–One Arizona community partner 
Other states have followed AZ’s lead in 
adopting anti-immigrant policies following 
Prop 200, and five states passed SB 1070-like 
laws:  Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South 
Carolina, and Utah.13 And the state’s activists 
began mustering their resolve. 
It brought a lot more urgency to our lives; it 
made it a real threat, less hypothetical, from, 
“It could happen” and, “It’s gonna happen” to, 
“It just happened.” It was personal for me, since 
my family and I were undocumented at that 
time. We had two options: leave and go back 
to our country or stay and fight and be part of 
the solution. Everybody around felt the urgency, 
and it brought us together. It was a no-brainer 
to build the political power to get the right type 
of legislation rather than the kind that harms 
our community.
–One Arizona community partner
After 2015 presidential campaign 
attacks on Mexico pushed fear of illegal 
immigration to the top of the political 
debate (notwithstanding the fact that 
fewer undocumented people than ever are 
entering the United States14), it surprised 
few when the 2016 Arizona presidential 
primary election focused on building 
a “wall” along the border. Controversy 
lingered, as state officials found 
themselves at the center of a national 
discussion about voter disenfranchisement 
and suppression: Maricopa County had 
slashed the number of election polling 
places by 85 percent since 2008, which 
many saw as targeting Latino voters 
11.  Randal C. Archibold, “Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,” The New York Times, April 23, 2010, http://nyti.ms/oF31fs.
12. Nicole Santa Cruz, “Arizona bill targeting ethnic studies signed into law,” Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512.
13. Ian Gordon and Tasneem Raja, “164 Anti-Immigration Laws Passed Since 2010? A MoJo Analysis,” Mother Jones, March/April 
2012, www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database.
14. Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Unauthorized immigrant population stable for half a decade,” Pew Research Center, July 22, 
2015, http://pewrsr.ch/1JfmaWK.
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in particular.15 And continuing his 
predecessor’s legacy of anti-immigrant 
legislation, Gov. Doug Ducey signed a bill 
that extended the criminal sentences of 
undocumented immigrants.16
Yet despite Arizona’s long history of anti-
immigrant policies and nativist rhetoric, 
Latinos and other progressive allies have 
never stopped organizing aggressively 
for a society that reflects the state’s best 
impulses rather than its worst. Arizona’s 
activists have refused to give up. 
SB 1070 inspired massive demonstrations 
after its passage17 and a boycott for years 
afterward, until the Supreme Court largely 
invalidated the law. And the law helped 
birth One Arizona.
Arpaio was terrorizing our community, and 
voters’ rights were being taken away. SB 
1070 was the last straw—it forced us, and 
the funders, to look at the situation in a 
different way.
–One Arizona founding partner
The 2010 law proscribing ethnic-studies 
courses led to a nationwide movement 
to promote such teaching.18 And in 2011, 
community activists scored a tangible 
victory (not through the nonpartisan One 
Arizona table) when voters recalled state 
Sen. Russell Pearce, the primary sponsor 
of SB 1070 and other anti-immigrant 
legislation.19 
Recalling Pearce was the turning point. The 
One Arizona C3 was relatively new, and [some 
individuals in the community] were in the middle 
of forming the C4. When the recall happened, we 
created an independent expenditure committee and 
pulled together SEIU, Every Voice, and a public 
campaign action fund, with C3s doing registration, 
and we saw a path to beat Pearce—and we did it, 
by 12 points. The groups that didn’t participate 
were embarrassed, and they were more eager to be 
involved going into the 2012 cycle. That was the big 
win that set the stage for everything since. 
–One Arizona founding partner
The backlash had 
finally arrived: 
Arizona’s recent 
history of being a 
bellwether for anti-
immigration policies, 
laced with ugly 
rhetoric and policies, 
created a political 
crisis that galvanized 
Latino and progressive 
communities—and 
helped create an 
enduring activist 
infrastructure.
15.  Griselda Nevarez, “Arizona: At Hearing, Latinos Demand Answers to Primary Voting Problems,” NBC News, March 29, 2016, 
http://nbcnews.to/1USwJVV; Sari Horwitz, “Democratic Party and Clinton campaign to sue Arizona over voting rights,” The 
Washington Post, April 14, 2016, http://wpo.st/6wVU1.
16. Kendal Blust, “Rhetoric over immigrants prompts new wave of legislation,” Arizona Daily Star, April 10, 2016, http://bit.ly/1W00404.
17. Nicholas Riccardi, “Thousands in Phoenix protest Arizona’s immigration law,” Los Angeles Times, May 29, 2010, http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/may/29/nation/la-na-arizona-protest-20100529-42.
18. J. Weston Phippen, “How One Law Banning Ethnic Studies Led to Its Rise,” The Atlantic, July 19, 2015, www.theatlantic.com/educa-
tion/archive/2015/07/how-one-law-banning-ethnic-studies-led-to-rise/398885/.
19. Amanda J. Crawford, “Arizona Immigration-Law Author Pearce Loses in Recall Election,” Bloomberg, Nov. 9, 2011, www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2011-11-09/arizona-senate-s-immigration-law-author-pearce-loses-in-recall-election.
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One Arizona Emerges
¡Ya basta! Enough is enough!
In the wake of SB 1070, ten community 
organizations came together to form One 
Arizona, agreeing on a collaborative pact 
to ensure accountability and leverage 
the best from each community partner 
to increase civic engagement, power, 
and safety for Arizona’s vulnerable Latino 
and immigrant communities. The ten 
community organizations—ACE, AZAN, 
BAN, CASE, DUSA, MFV, PAZ, Puente, 
Southwest Conference UCC and PAFCO 
—appointed MFV program director 
Francisco Heredia to serve as One 
Arizona’s table director as he maintained 
his responsibilities with MFV. With the 
exception of a brief period in 2012 and 
again in 2013, Mr. Heredia served as table 
director until fall 2015 when Ian Danley 
succeeded him. 
The impetus of founding One Arizona was 
not only SB 1070 but the decades of attacks 
on immigrants: English-only in 2004, voter 
suppression, denying benefits to undocumented, 
in-state students, and bail and bonds. The 
community realized, “¡Ya basta!” Enough is 
enough. We tried to maximize the opportunity 
that SB 1070 brought, using it to rally and 
organize around.
–One Arizona founding partner
Overcoming distrust
It’s all too common for activists to engage in 
turf wars, and Arizona’s were no exception. 
Decades of grassroots organizing had been 
carried out mostly in silos, with advocates 
focusing on particular issues. 
Prior to SB 1070 and the development of One 
Arizona, there was a real reputation in the advocacy 
community for division and disorganization, with 
infighting and competition for attention and resources. 
–Arizona elected official
Competition for funding proved to be a 
predictably sticky issue—one that the new 
table helped to solve.
There is always the shadow of the looming funding 
world that makes us all compete against each other. 
The One Arizona table provided member groups 
a way to overcome that challenge by seeking joint 
funding on [advocacy issues our groups work on]. 
There were ideological differences, but we agreed 
on one thing—we all wanted to increase civic 
participation as One Arizona. 
–One Arizona founding partner
One Arizona was able to help groups coalesce 
and move from a “toxic culture of in-fighting, 
competition, stepping on each other’s toes” 
toward a more aligned, collaborative, and 
united movement focused on increasing 
Latino voter engagement, turnout, and power.
Good work was happening, but not enough 
strategy or coordination was happening behind 
the resources, and resentment was growing across 
different relationships and organizations, most of 
it centered on the lack of accountability. We knew 
we were doing things sloppily but couldn’t measure 
the impact any of us was having in the electoral 
front; nobody had those relationships. We were 
all stressed working in a very toxic environment, 
and bad culture sank in between us. One Arizona 
offered us a space to leverage collectively for more 
resources and training, offering a route for clear 
accountability across organizations. 
–One Arizona founding partner
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The state’s high-profile anti-immigrant 
legislation and political figures brought 
national attention—welcome, of course, 
but complicating local groups’ efforts to 
coordinate and maximize effectiveness.
When Gov. Brewer signed SB 1070 into law, 
national groups woke up to the challenge, and 
several of them parachuted into the state. A lot 
of Arizona groups felt, “Where were you when 
we needed you in the springtime?” There was 
considerable tension, especially since the national 
groups selected who they worked with. It was 
an ugly situation. After 1070 became law, there 
was a big protest march through Phoenix; it was 
really impressive—100,000 people marching 
through the streets—but unfortunate that, 
behind the scenes, there was so much competition 
between what the march organizers and what 
other groups were doing. There were competing 
events all happening around the state capitol, 
which wasn’t pretty. Everybody hated SB 1070 
and these anti-immigrant measures, but they 
didn’t know how to work together.
–One Arizona funder partner
Funders step up
One Arizona represented the first 
coordinated effort to align advocacy 
organizations’ vision and strategies. Four 
Freedoms Fund (FFF) offered critical seed 
funding at the very beginning for the 
project to develop in its first two years. FFF 
listened for, identified, and then invested 
in three shared areas of capacity building 
for One Arizona—communications, 
organizing, and voter engagement 
training—that lessened the burden 
on individual organizations. Unbound 
Philanthropy made its first grant to One 
Arizona in 2012, and these two funding 
sources have been One Arizona’s mainstay 
funding sources up to now. 
Funders brought in a couple of things that 
we don’t see in other tables: expertise in 
running voter engagement campaigns and 
in communications—messaging, graphics, 
mailings, how to best use the Spanish media to 
communicate with our community. They took 
away some of the funding, but also took away 
a lot of the fighting.
–One Arizona founding partner
“The biggest 
challenge was 
agreeing on strategy. 
There was a lot of 
mistrust between the 
groups—who was 
deciding strategy and 
turf and precincts—for 
the first two or three 
years. Now, the groups 
lean on each other 
and build on each 
other, working on civic 
engagement.” 
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Bringing aboard Crossroads Campaigns, 
managing consultant of We Are America 
Alliance, proved enormously helpful 
both in adding expertise and relieving 
administrative pressure.
With John Miyasato and Crossroads, we 
got someone to help us develop a plan and 
program, train people, and communicate 
actual costs to funders. The fact that someone 
else was going to take on these tasks and free us 
to focus on voter registration—that was music 
to my ears. 
–One Arizona founding partner
Crossroads, as an impartial participant, made 
a significant contribution: They were able to 
say whether a plan was viable or not, and help 
us carve up turf.
–One Arizona founding member 
The capacity building support enabled One 
Arizona member groups and activists to 
link their own stories with engaging Latino 
voters and tracking data.
New Organizing Institute showed us how 
to tell our story, recruit, have one-on-one 
conversations with community folk, and build 
an empowered team within the community. We 
began tracking how we talked to individuals 
and became experts at data management, 
seeing what works and what doesn’t. Being 
fearless is good, but being data-driven—
knowing what types of messaging hit home 
with families—is very significant.
–One Arizona community partner
Interviews with twenty-eight key 
stakeholders and twelve partners in a 
focus group highlight the core ingredients 
that allowed the One Arizona table to 
form, endure, and remain effective, from 
nonpartisan year-round voter engagement 
and clear accountability mechanisms to 
coordinating with groups that had a clear 
advocacy agenda strategies and changing 
the way targeted citizens view democracy 
itself. Perhaps most important: One 
Arizona’s guidance has helped encourage, 
develop, and train a large number of 
young activists, creating a new, committed 
generation of leadership.
A vision for building Latino power
One Arizona began with a Latino focus: 
nurturing the interests and concerns of Latino 
and immigrant communities by building 
Latino political power, including boosting 
voter participation. 
It wasn’t a progressive agenda that brought us 
together. We see people of color marginalized 
even in progressive environments. So we 
formed around Latinos voting and prioritized 
that issue. Especially when the policy and 
environment in Arizona is formed around 
racialized attacks and dynamics, this response 
One Arizona:
Outcomes, Achievements, Successes
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makes sense. To ignore the racialized dynamics 
would be to ignore what is creating the problem 
in the first place.
–One Arizona staffer
We’re always asked to join other efforts, but 
Latino voices do not get nurtured. It’s not like 
we don’t recognize white progressive voices, 
but we’re aiming to focus the table on Latino 
voices from the beginning: to register Latinos 
to vote and put them on the Permanent Early 
Voter List.
–One Arizona community partner
In coming together as a visible, vocal 
force for power in Latino and immigrant 
communities, One Arizona orchestrated a 
powerful ongoing act of resistance against 
state terror on immigrants and those who 
look like they could be immigrants. The 
group also has served as an important 
point of reference in a national arena, 
with resistance to anti-immigrant policy in 
Arizona serving as the “spark that lights a 
fire” nationally. 
For me, it moved people from fear to hope, 
from desperation to intentionality, from despair 
to courage. 
–One Arizona founding partner
Year-round civic engagement focus
In targeting nonpartisan voter registration, 
early voting, turnout, and voter protection, 
One Arizona looks to boost the vote share 
of the New American Majority electorate, 
especially Latino voters.
Our organization is specifically concerned 
with vulnerable communities: elderly, kids, 
residents that make $20,000 and below. 
It’s a difficult demographic to work with—
they’re more transient, or even homeless, 
and 70 percent are not registered to vote. 
When we are reaching out to people who 
are disconnected and uninformed, we have 
only a few minutes to inspire and educate 
and galvanize and try to create an ongoing 
connection. Our work is trying to tell them 
that they can have influence in the political 
process. That’s what I am most proud of: We 
are bringing more people to the table.
 –One Arizona community partner
Clear accountability mechanisms
From the start, the collaborative effort 
depended on accountability and transparency, 
matching commitment to capacity and 
demanding results, identifying and setting 
goals and then using data to keep each table 
member accountable. 
In the beginning, organizations claimed to do 
more work than capacity dictated. So part of 
the growing pains was creating mechanisms 
for organizations to be truthful about what 
they can do.
–One Arizona community partner 
The table has insisted on us using the Voter 
Activation Network, and I love it. If you 
claim to reach thirty thousand people but the 
VAN shows only fifteen thousand, you get 
paid for fifteen thousand. Having technical 
assistance and holding folks accountable—
calling out groups that are not doing what 
they said—has been key.
–One Arizona community partner 
“That’s what I am 
most proud of: We are 
bringing more people 
to the table.”
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Strong, connected relationships across 
organizations and campaigns
One Arizona has played the important role 
of linking individuals across organizations, 
strengthening existing relationships. 
We had all worked on immigrant rights 
together, but not in a coordinated way. That 
commonality of issue—and fights that we had 
been in—created trust.
–One Arizona staff
I give a lot of credit to the funders for believing 
in the possibility to begin with. That risk 
has paid off. Very quickly we learned there’s 
a path—not just protests and marches but 
including a civic engagement path to engage 
people in change. Organizations in the table 
understood we’re much stronger together.
–One Arizona founding partner
Funders adding value beyond grants
Stakeholders agree: Consistent, durable 
funding from Four Freedoms Fund 
and Unbound Philanthropy has kept 
organizational leaders at the table in spite of 
past grudges and differences in organizing 
approaches, histories, priorities, and 
missions. Beyond that, funders have played 
an active role in lifting up the organizations’ 
work, brokering relationships and introducing 
additional funding.
A couple of organizations I can’t stand to be in 
the same room with, so it hasn’t always been 
perfect or easy. I’ve learned about patience and 
perseverance. At moments I feel everyone in the 
coalition have hated me, but I didn’t leave the 
conversation or the table.
–One Arizona founding partner
Four Freedoms Fund has offered assessment 
and board training. People don’t understand 
all of the demands of being an executive 
director, and providing consultants for EDs has 
been critical. Coalitions are really hard! To 
run them, you have to have thick skin, be very 
strategic, and understand the politics. If you’re 
the ED, you don’t have anyone to talk to, and 
normally EDs don’t run to funders because they 
might punish you for having problems. There’s 
a pretty remarkable relationship between One 
Arizona and Four Freedoms and Unbound 
Philanthropy.
–One Arizona community partner 
The character of this funding partnership—
with funders offering care, respect, 
encouragement, and space for work to 
mature—should not be downplayed. Funders 
became partners by not leaving—and by 
listening carefully and learning; they were able 
to strike a balance between being circumspect 
and encouraging, between making 
suggestions and having ownership.
It’s not an easy task to working in a coalition 
while building and sustaining your own 
organization. Groups sometimes find it hard to 
share their vulnerabilities and organizational 
capacities; it takes a lot of courage to work in 
this environment, and at the end of the day, 
they still have to build their own organizations. 
One Arizona is not going to sustain them. 
You don’t want the money to be the thing that 
drives everything. And as a funder, you cannot 
have a specific agenda, demanding a certain 
result. It’s really important for funders not to 
be overly ambitious or prescriptive. We might 
offer friendly advice or suggest this or that, as 
long as they’re moving in the direction for the 
common good, and you have to be patient to 
ride over the bumps; they have to work things 
out among themselves. Don’t look over their 
shoulders.
–One Arizona funder partner
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Capacity-building support
From the outset, funders provided technical 
assistance in three primary areas: field 
program expertise from John Miyasato 
of Crossroads Campaign to develop a 
voter engagement and tracking system, 
including assigning territory, support in 
communications and messaging for the 
Spanish-speaking community from Torres 
Marquez, and finally, training from the New 
Organizing Institute.  
Because of support and training that One 
Arizona has provided for us as partners, 
we have been able to develop volunteers to 
do data, go from paper to iPads, do charts, 
mobilize classmates, and conduct voter 
registration marathons. It’s how I know how to 
navigate, cut turf, analyze data, report data, 
work with social media. I have been part of 
groups that were more interested in growing 
recognition than in other organizations in the 
coalition. One Arizona invests in us to make 
One Arizona better.
–One Arizona community partner
We’ll play the bad cop when needed, trying 
to make sure all the groups are working with 
an even playing field, so everyone has a fair 
chance and a set of common standards to do 
their organizing. That’s what built a lot of 
trust with the vast majority of the groups. It’s 
really good to see how much they work together 
now. You could feel the sense of competition 
in 2010, but now there’s a ton of trust, and 
they’ve become one organization in many 
ways—not just a coalition but a family.”
–Capacity builder
Using data to inform and adjust     
field strategies
A sharp focus on hard data is built into the 
architecture of the collaborative; organizing 
efforts are numbers-driven. This has made 
it possible to project and measure impact 
and better design campaign strategy. Table 
partners have access to the Voter Activation 
Network, a collective vehicle to store and 
review data, which had been typically 
available only to large entities such as a 
national political party, and can maximize 
efforts to reach people. 
Before the One 
Arizona table, groups 
tried to do this work 
on our own. We 
were duplicating 
efforts and in each 
other’s turf, not as 
data-driven as we 
should have been, 
with duplication of 
registration efforts 
and big margins 
of error. Now, each 
group can dig 
into the areas in 
which it wants to 
strategically build: 
the immigration 
fight, Fight for 15, 
unionizing hotel 
workers. 
-One Arizona founding partner
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Neutral space where different roles 
and strategies are respected
The table comprises a range of 
organizations that utilize strategies ranging 
from civic engagement to direct-service 
provision. One Arizona provides a neutral, 
safe space where partners can discuss 
campaigns, goals, desired outcomes, and 
who’s doing what. 
I can bring in ideas and use the table as 
a testing ground. The table can help f lesh 
out ideas and provide a space for groups to 
work together.
–Focus group participant
Building long-term, sustainable 
political power
One Arizona’s efforts have awakened 
elected officials and governing bodies to 
the significance of Latino voters’ concerns. 
This introduced a new accountability loop: 
Officeholders must now be responsive to a 
broader segment of Arizona’s voting population 
than before, translating into real systems change 
and a transformed political landscape.
The table has changed the game. Now 
Arizona’s legislature sees us as a force to be 
reckoned with; when they propose legislation 
that is harmful to the community, they must 
strategize around the table and its partners. 
We did not have this power and leverage a 
couple of years ago.
–Consultant and adviser 
We have been able to change the dynamics of 
how candidates campaign. Historically, they 
have focused on high-efficacy white voters, but 
after our field programs and turnout efforts, 
they must look to underrepresented areas as 
well. If you invest, you can change the rules 
and electorate, and now there’s actual data of 
how it can be done. 
–One Arizona founding member
Efforts don’t stop with One Arizona’s coordinated 
work, or with member groups’ direct action—
with the table as a platform, raising awareness 
and consciousness, activists have empowered 
individuals and independent groups. 
We’ve been able to show people that we can be 
a force. Even though numbers do not support 
us in a lot of areas in the state, we can have a 
say in the places that are ours: Phoenix and to 
the south. We have seen more people of color 
elected; we have seen more people of color in 
the organizations thriving and growing; more 
people are speaking up in our communities.
–One Arizona founding partner
We’re all clearer now 
which organizations 
do which things 
well when it comes 
to the work: direct 
action, know-your-
rights training, 
communications, 
legislation 
tracking, and voter 
registration. With a 
general collaborative 
infrastructure, we 
trust each other and 
can find our lanes. 
-One Arizona founding partner
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Winning elections is not the end—it’s the 
means. It’s policy that’s the end. And advocacy 
after each election to make sure the political 
power and strength is located within the 
organizations or the party or elected officials—
and within the community, to hold politicians 
accountable.
–One Arizona community partner 
One Arizona’s infrastructure and network 
provides both an anchor and an incubator, 
supporting new partnerships and endeavors. 
Most often cited by stakeholders in this light: 
One Arizona’s DACA DAPA lmplementation 
Working Group and Arizona’s Student Vote 
Coalition. 
We want to be the incubator, the place where 
young organizations come together and get 
tools and resources and take over the world. 
–One Arizona community partner
Developing leaders to pave the way to 
a new Arizona
Powerful social movements that have 
transformed the course of human history have 
always had young people in leadership. In this 
country, the role of young leaders have been 
deeply important to every progressive social 
movement, including the civil-rights movement, 
the transnational LGBTQ movement, successive 
waves of feminism, environmentalism and 
environmental justice, and the labor, antiwar, 
and immigrant-rights movements.20 One 
Arizona can count the development of young 
leaders as one of its key achievements. 
In 2006, I came in as 
a volunteer. Then I 
became a canvass 
leader—not involved 
in decision-making, 
just making sure all of 
my canvassers were 
trained. And now, with 
One Arizona’s support, 
I am the program 
director in charge of 
our organization’s 
statewide civic 
engagement work. In 
a sense, they created 
me, in the position I am 
today, and it has given 
me the chance to help 
some of our volunteers 
grow in the same way. 
-One Arizona founding partner
20.   Sasha Constanza-Chock, “Youth and Social Movements: 
Key Lessons for Allies,” Kinder & Braver World Project, Dec. 
7, 2012, http://cyber.law.harvard. edu/sites/cyber.law.har-
vard.edu/files/KBWYouthandSocialMovements2012_0.pdf
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One Arizona successfully tapped into the 
righteous anger and resistance of Latino youth, 
organizing their energy to go out in 118-degree 
summer heat to knock on more than one million 
doors, and animating their imagination of an 
Arizona that believes in and respects them. 
In 2010, all of the organizations, because of the 
moment that we were in, were able to develop 
a strong pool of passionate volunteers who were 
directly affected by the issue. Those volunteers 
are now in leadership positions, like myself, 
and organizers and volunteers are constantly 
being developed to become the next cadre. One 
Arizona has really invested in individuals, 
getting the community involved, and we are 
seeing so many rewards in that. We’re building 
lasting relationships with people who want to 
make community organizing a career path.
–One Arizona community partner 
One Arizona has provided an effective container 
in which volunteers have become organizers 
and assumed organizational and movement 
leadership. It has done so by providing three 
very concrete things: purposeful agenda, skills 
training, and space to build community. 
The training One Arizona provides is not just how 
to knock on doors but education on what it means 
to be a leader and an organizer. They’re building 
these young people’s organizational and leadership 
skills, cultivating a generation of leaders involved 
in something larger than themselves. Lots of them 
are undocumented and can’t even vote, and here 
they are participating in the American democratic 
process! I haven’t seen that since the farmworker 
movement and Cesar Chavez. 
–Elected official 
Qualitative interviews make clear that—
beyond winning elections and gaining 
electoral power—One Arizona’s key 
achievement is recruiting and cultivating 
leaders, inspiring young Latinos and other 
activists to choose careers in the social sector 
and join the social justice movement. 
I would not be working in this movement if it 
weren’t for One Arizona. I was fresh out of the 
Marine Corps when SB 1070 passed, and I was 
angry and went to the Capitol. I went from a 
volunteer to an executive director in less than 
four years. In helping to transition community 
members to community leaders, One Arizona has 
made social justice a viable career path for young 
people who might work for a small grassroots 
organization and build skills that are relevant 
and valuable. For me, the most valuable thing 
has been being given an opportunity to lead, to 
show what I could do, to show that given the 
right challenge and opportunity I can lead. If 
I didn’t have those opportunities, I would be 
working at a bank or a corporation. We have 
talent, but without opportunities to harness that 
talent, we would lose a lot of individuals who can 
be extremely valuable in our movement. 
–One Arizona community partner 
In a short amount of time, One Arizona has 
grown a vibrant, organic garden of capable 
leaders, giving them voice, methodology, and 
a tangible community. 
What impresses me is seeing these individuals grow 
as organizers and leaders. In 2015, a subset of the 
One Arizona table formed a working group to 
work with undocumented immigrants for President 
Obama’s deferred action for parents of U.S.-born 
children, now being litigated in the Supreme 
Court. They’ve formed a table, using the habits 
they developed, like having a common calendar, 
materials, scheduling, and meetings, and can figure 
out divisions of labor and not trip over each other.
–One Arizona community partner 
The development and transformation of 
young leaders is steadily changing the game 
and paving the way to a new Arizona.
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Voter Engagement, 
Turnout, and PEVL Data
PART TWO:
To understand One Arizona’s impact on the state’s electoral landscape, we now turn to an examination 
of voter data, and the clear conclusion: 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts have consistently 
increased voter turnout. The impact is strongest among 
low-propensity Latino voters, meaning registered voters 
who do not usually vote. One Arizona has expanded the 
electorate by turning out low-propensity voters, and it 
consistently does so in the double digits. Furthermore, 
One Arizona’s focus on increasing the number of low-
propensity Latino and New American Majority voters 
to get them onto the Permanent Early Voter List (PEVL, 
or the equivalent of vote-by-mail), which is widely 
recognized as an effective way to overcome some of the 
barriers for low-income voters and voters of color.
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One Arizona deployed three focused strategies 
to engage voters and increase turnout:
1. They targeted low-propensity Latinos 
—those who are eligible but haven’t 
registered, or registered but don’t vote.
2. They made it a point to sign up low-
propensity Latinos and New American 
Majority voters for PEVL so they can more 
easily vote by mail.
3. They used door-to-door canvassing 
and phone banks to encourage those 
registered to actually go vote.
From 2010 to 2015, we see the growth and 
maturation of One Arizona’s voter engagement 
tactics. By moving away from less efficacious 
modes of voter outreach such as robocalls, 
by strategically targeting mailers, and by 
focusing direct contact efforts to door-to-door 
canvassing, One Arizona has been able to 
translate the success it has had during even-
year federal elections (e.g., the 2010 midterm 
general election) to its work during odd-year 
municipal elections (e.g., the 2011 municipal 
elections in Phoenix) when voter turnout is 
normally lower than federal election years.
We begin with a year-by-year analysis of the 
voter data, followed by a summary of the 
five-year period of this evaluation study. The 
quantitative component in this study uses the 
bias-adjusted methodology, and evaluates 
three different measures of efficacy. 
The intent-to-treat effect compares turnout 
among voters One Arizona successfully engaged 
and turnout among voters who were not 
engaged. This measure does not account for 
the fact that some of the voters One Arizona 
attempted to contact were not engaged. It also 
does not account for the possibility that the 
voters One Arizona engaged were already more 
likely to vote. However, it is included because it 
is perhaps the most intuitive measure of efficacy. 
The second measure, the instrumental variable 
method, uses contact rates to adjust for bias. 
It is include here because it is a familiar and 
commonly used measure in voter engagement 
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs).21 
However, it is not likely to effectively adjust for 
bias for our purposes here given One Arizona 
did not determine who to attempt to engage 
using a random assignment procedure.22 
The third measure, which is the most desirable, 
uses a statistical method referred to as inverse 
probability weighting. This method is designed 
for non-randomized observational studies, 
which is the category of research that the 
work of One Arizona falls under. This measure 
reweighs the voters One Arizona successfully 
engaged to reflect the characteristics of the 
voters One Arizona did not attempt to contact—
this ensures that the voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged are not a “stacked deck.”23 
Another strength of this approach is that we 
can “feed” the model multiple characteristics 
simultaneously. Altogether, the methods used 
subject One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
to rigorous empirical tests.  
The glossary of terms that follows provides a 
guide for readers who are not as familiar with 
these very specific voter data definitions.
21.  For example, see Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter 
Turnout: A Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review 94, no. 03 (2000): 653–63.
22.  This is a commonly used measure to evaluate the treatment effect of canvassing in a RCT. More specifically, an 
instrumental variable regression is used to estimate the effect of voter engagement on turnout. This method adjusts for bias in 
two steps. The first step is to model the likelihood of successfully engaging a voter using random assignment as an independent 
variable. The intuition here is that random assignment is related to whether a voter contact is attempted, but is not related to 
whether a voter votes. The results of the first stage analysis are then used to create a new variable—one that still reflects whether a 
voter is engaged, but is weighed differently based on contact rates—that is used to estimate a bias-adjusted treatment effect.
23.  This proceeds in two steps. The first stage is to model the likelihood of contact by as many characteristics that we can feed the 
model. To illustrate, if we suspected that One Arizona was “stacking the deck” by engaging higher-propensity voters, the 
first stage model would include vote propensity as a factor.
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Attempted 
Voter 
Engagement
(i.e., outreach 
attempts)
Successful 
Voter 
Engagements
Contact Rate
Unique Voters
Glossary of Terms
Defined as all efforts made to engage a 
voter. Attempted voter engagements come 
in different modes. The main modes include 
door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, 
and mailers.
Example: 1,000 attempted voter 
engagements. 
Not all attempted voter engagements 
are successful. For example, door knocks 
can go unanswered and phone numbers 
can be dialed but may be disconnected. A 
successful voter engagement thus refers to an 
attempted voter engagement that is coded as 
“canvassed.”
Example: 500 successful voter 
engagements. 
The contact rate is the number of successful 
voter engagements divided by the number of 
attempted voter engagements. Contact rates 
can vary widely, but a minimum 10% contact 
rate for door-to-door canvassing and 5% 
contact rate for live phone banking provide 
baselines. 
Example: 500 successful voter engagements 
divided by 1,000 attempted voter 
engagements equals a 50% contact rate.
During a field program, one voter may 
be the target of multiple attempted voter 
engagements. For example, a voter may 
be included in a door-to-door canvassing 
effort, as well as in a live phone banking 
effort. The number of unique voters in a 
field program thus provides an indicator of 
the breadth of the field program.
Example: 500 unique voters were 
targeted in 1,000 attempted voter 
engagements. In this scenario, each 
unique voter may have been included in 
a door-to-door canvassing effort and a 
live phone banking effort (e.g., 500 x 2). 
1,000
500
Attempted Voter Engagements
Successful Voter Engagements
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Unique Voters 
Successfully 
Engaged
Voter Turnout
Voter Turnout: 
Successfully 
Engaged
Intent-to-Treat 
Effect
During a field program, contact 
rates provide an initial window 
into the breadth of a field 
program. However, unless we 
unpack the number of unique 
voters successfully engaged, it 
is difficult to evaluate the true 
breadth of an organization’s voter 
engagement efforts.
Example: Out of 500 unique 
voters targeted, 250 unique 
voters were successfully 
engaged. 
The evaluation of voter engagement 
efforts center on metrics related 
to voter turnout. At the most basic 
level, voter turnout represents the 
percentage of registered voters in an 
electorate who voted.
Example: 5,000 out of 10,000 
registered voters voted, which 
represents 50% voter turnout. 
There is a strong impulse among 
organizations to evaluate their voter 
engagement efforts by focusing solely 
on turnout among those who were 
successfully engaged. However, for 
reasons discussed in the quantitative 
appendix, this metric paints an 
incomplete portrait of efficacy.  
Example: 150 out of 250 successfully 
engaged voters voted, which 
represents 60% voter turnout. 
The intent-to-treat effect is one common 
way, albeit an inadequate one (it does not 
adjust for potential bias, as explained in 
the quantitative appendix), to easure the 
impact of a voter engagement effort. In 
general, the intent-to-treat effect is voter 
turnout among those successfully engaged 
minus voter turnout among a comparison 
group selected from the general electorate. 
Example: 60% of voters successfully 
engaged voted compared to 50% of 
the rest of the electorate; thus the 
intent-to-treat effect is 10%.
1,000
500
Attempted Voter Engagements
Unique Voters
250
Unique Voters Successfully Engaged
Comparison Group
(general electorate)
Successfully
Engaged
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Voter Turnout: 
Targeted But 
Not Engaged
Voter Turnout: 
Comparable 
Non-Targeted 
Voters
Bias-Adjusted 
Treatment 
Effect
In order to more fully evaluate efficacy, it 
is necessary to also look at turnout among 
those who were targeted, but were not 
successfully engaged. This begins the 
process of diagnosing whether the voters 
who were successfully engaged represent 
a biased sub-group of voters.
Example: 175 out of 250 registered 
voters who were targeted but were 
not successfully engaged voted, 
which represents 70% voter turnout.
As an additional step to more fully 
evaluate efficacy, it is also necessary to 
look at turnout among comparable voters 
who were not targeted. In the absence 
of a randomized control trial (RCT), these 
voters are used as a comparison group.
Example: 300 out of 500 comparable 
voters who were not targeted voted, 
which represents 65% voter turnout. 
The main criticism of the intent-to-treat effect is that it does not take into account 
known sources of potential bias. More specifically, it does not address the likelihood 
that those successfully engaged were already more likely to vote. It also does not 
address the possibility that those successfully engaged differ significantly with 
respect to key demographic or socioeconomic characteristics. Whereas the intent-
to-treat effect can overstate the efficacy of a voter engagement effort, bias-adjusted 
treatment effects provide closer approximations of the actual effect. 
Example: Adjusting for selection effect (i.e., already more likely to vote):  
Where t  is the treatment effect, Pe is turnout among the treatment group,
Pc is turnout among the control group, and a is the response rate.
Here, Pe = a (Pr + t) + (1 - a) Pnr . Importantly, this means that turnout 
among those in the treatment group is a function of whether a voter is 
reachable. This is done using the instrumental variable method.
Adjusting for differences in key demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics using the inverse probability weighting method for non-RCTs:
(1) Fit logistic regression model, Pr(Contact = 1|X), wherein Pr represents 
the predicted probability of a successful engagement and X is a vector of 
individual-level characteristics;
(2) IPW = 1/Pr, which determines inverse probability weights for those 
successfully engaged;
(3) IPW = 1-Pr, which determines inverse probability weights for those not 
engaged. 
Comparison Group
(general electorate)
Successfully
Engaged
t =
Pe - Pc
a
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Year-by-Year Election Analysis
The following section is a year-by-year analysis of the voter engagement and turnout data for 
One Arizona, highlighting federal and local elections results across the various voter engagement 
modalities. Each year begins with what was at stake to provide some overall context. Table 1 
summarizes the results.
Even-Year 
Federal 
Elections Date Description
Bias-Adjusted 
Treatment 
Effect
Bias-Adjusted 
Treatment 
Effect: Latinos
2010 November 2 General 10.1% 19.9%
2012 November 6 General 13.6% 19.6%
2014 November 4 General 6.1% 13.2%
Odd-Year 
Municipal 
Elections
2011 August 30 Phoenix Municipal 
Primary
0.5% to 0.6% 6.4% to 6.6%
2011 November 8 Phoenix Municipal 
General
-1.2% to -0.8% 4.9% to 6.3%
2013 August 27 Phoenix Municipal 
Primary
8.5% 12.1%
2013 November 5 Phoenix Municipal 
General
Ns 6.5%
2015 August 25 Phoenix Municipal 
Primary
11.1% 17.1%
Table 1.  2010-2015 Voter Engagement and Turnout Results
Ns = not statistically significant. Note: The treatment effect for even-year elections focuses on low-propensity voters. The 
range for the 2011 municipal elections reflects the results when including robocalls, and when excluding robocalls. 2011 was 
the only year in which One Arizona relied heavily on robocalls.
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During this first year, One Arizona heavily 
targeted low-propensity Latino voters by 
knocking on each door two to three times, 
making repeated live and automated phone 
calls, and mailing voters campaign literature. 
A multicomponent communications plan that 
included paid, earned, and social media efforts 
complemented coalition field activities during 
the course of the campaign. 
During the 2010 general election campaign, One 
Arizona made 1,159,018 attempted contacts to 
298,981 unique voters; 86.8 percent of these unique 
voters were in Maricopa County, Pima County, and 
Yuma County.24 Some 77.8 percent of the unique 
voters targeted during the 2010 general election 
were low-propensity voters;25 83.7 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino and 12.2 percent were Caucasian. 
Door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, and 
mailers accounted for nearly all of the coalition’s 
attempted outreach. Door-to-door canvassing 
accounted for 24.1 percent of attempted contacts, 
live phone banking accounted for 30.4 percent, 
and mailers accounted for 38.4 percent. The door-
to-door canvassing rate was 38.8 percent; the live 
phone banking contact rate was 25.1 percent.
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout among low-propensity 
voters by a strong 10.1 percent: Whereas, 
overall, 31.3 percent of low-propensity voters 
in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma 
County voted during the 2010 general election, 
41.4 percent of the low-propensity voters whom 
One Arizona successfully engaged voted.26
When focusing the analysis on low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters, the data shows an 
even stronger increase in turnout: a robust 
19.9 percent. Whereas 21.2 percent of low-
propensity Hispanics/Latinos in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County voted 
during the 2010 general election, 41.1 percent 
of the low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos whom 
One Arizona successfully engaged voted.
The bottom line: In 
focusing on low-
propensity Latinos—by 
definition the hardest 
voters to reach and 
mobilize—the One 
Arizona table brought 
almost 13,000 new voters 
to the electorate in 2010.
2010:  SB 1070 Inspired Anger into Action—   
“¡Ya Basta! Enough!”
24. Based on 240,856 voters for whom data is available. Such slippage is common. More specifically, as the amount of time 
increases between when a field program happens and when a data vendor requests data—be it from VAN (which One 
Arizona uses) or even a county registrar of voters—voter files inevitably change as people move, die, etc.
25. Based on 240,864 voters for whom vote history data is available
26. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County, 
Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election.
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By deepening collaboration among partners, 
in taking seriously the lessons learned in 
the previous election cycle, and by being 
receptive to technical assistance, the Table 
built on the foundation it laid in 2010 during 
the following municipal primary campaign. 
SB 1070, while under appeal, remained in 
effect. Sheriff Joe Arpaio announced that 
officers would patrol polling places to check 
for undocumented Mexicans voting. In 
response, One Arizona launched an election 
protection campaign, training and placing 
volunteers at polling places to mitigate 
Arpaio’s strategy. At the local level, Phoenix 
elected progressive mayor Greg Stanton, and 
Daniel Valenzuela’s City Council victory tipped 
the balance to a 5-to-4 progressive majority. 
Sheriff Arpaio made a TV commercial that 
he was going to patrol polling places, to make 
sure Mexicans were legally able to vote. We 
responded with an election protection program: 
We published in Spanish papers and went into 
the communities, people staffed outreach tables, 
and on election day we had people who were 
trained at the sites to answer questions.
–One Arizona community partner
In 2011, partners and allies’ civic engagement 
efforts began to bear fruit; the low-
propensity Hispanic/Latino voters mobilized 
by the table were instrumental in increasing 
Latino voter turnout. The coalition rolled 
out its first voter guide to help new voters in 
particular navigate the ballot.
During the 2011 municipal primary election 
in Phoenix, One Arizona made 191,038 
attempted contacts to 41,969 unique 
voters; 83.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino.27 
Attempted contacts were spread across door-
to-door canvassing, live phone banking, 
mailers, and other modes of contact 
(mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing 
accounted for 20.6 percent of attempted 
contacts, live phone banking accounted for 
10.5 percent of attempted contacts, mailers 
accounted for 21.9 percent of attempted 
contacts, and other modes accounted for 
46.9 percent of attempted contacts. The 
door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 
44.2 percent; the live phone banking contact 
rate was 40.6 percent.
2011: One Arizona is innovative, swift, precise, 
and growing
In 2011, partners 
and allies’ civic 
engagement efforts 
began to bear fruit; 
the low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino 
voters mobilized 
by the table were 
instrumental in 
increasing Latino 
voter turnout.
27. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election. 
28. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 41,969 voters.
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The data indicates that One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts during the 2011 primary 
campaign in Phoenix had a modest effect 
of between 0.5 percent (when including 
robocalls) and 0.6 percent (when excluding 
robocalls) among all voters. But the results 
are drastically different when focusing on 
Hispanic/Latino voters: One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts increased turnout among 
targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by between 
6.6 percent (when including robocalls) and 6.4 
percent (when excluding robocalls).28
Months later, during the general election 
campaign, One Arizona made 117,873 
attempted contacts to 32,144 unique voters; 
89.1 percent were Hispanic/Latino. Attempted 
contacts were spread across door-to-door 
canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and 
other modes of contact (mainly robocalls). 
Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 19.4 
percent of attempted contacts, live phone 
banking accounted for 5.1 percent of attempted 
contacts, mailers accounted for 30.8 percent 
of attempted contacts, and other modes 
accounted for 44.7 percent of attempted 
contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact 
rate was 33.9 percent; the live phone banking 
contact rate was 36.9 percent.
Analyzing all voters, the data indicates that 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2011 municipal general election 
campaign in Phoenix did not increase turnout 
among targeted voters. However, similar 
to the pattern for the primary election, the 
results are drastically different when focusing 
only on Hispanic/Latino voters: The coalition’s 
voter engagement efforts increased turnout 
among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters 
by between 4.9 percent (when including 
robocalls) and 6.3 percent (when excluding 
robocalls).
Overall, the turnout rate for low-propensity 
Latino voters lagged the general population, 
as might be expected, but the numbers were 
far closer than they would have been without 
One Arizona’s efforts. In the August 2011 
primary, overall turnout was 22.3 percent; 
20 percent of low-propensity Latinos turned 
out. In the November general election, 28.6 
percent of Phoenix voters turned out, against 
21.4 percent of low-propensity Latino voters.
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Nationally, 2012 saw big movement in 
immigration policy: President Obama 
announced the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in June, 
in the middle of the election campaign. In 
Maricopa County, Sheriff Arpaio launched a 
re-election campaign. 
One Arizona continued to grow and 
innovate, testing its ability to mobilize voters 
and increase turnout. Table members’ 
experience with One Arizona enhanced 
their ability to secure funding support on 
an individual basis from various funding 
sources that helped build the coalition’s 
leadership and capacity. One Arizona 
launched its DACA workgroup, coalescing, 
coordinating, and growing DACA work 
across the state. 
During the 2012 general election campaign, 
One Arizona made 366,090 attempted 
contacts to 205,828 unique voters; 88.9 
percent of these unique voters were in 
Maricopa County and Pima County.29 Two-
thirds of the unique voters targeted by One 
2012: Increasing impact, partnerships, 
perseverance
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The voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged 
during the 2012 general 
election campaign 
were statistically 
significantly more 
likely to vote than those 
One Arizona attempted 
to contact but were 
unable to reach; this 
holds true across the 
entire range of vote 
propensities.
Arizona during the 2012 general election 
were low-propensity voters.30 Some 81.5 
percent were Hispanic/Latino; 15.3 percent 
were Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing 
and live phone banking accounted for nearly 
all of One Arizona’s attempted outreach. 
The door-to-door canvassing contact rate 
was 22.2 percent; the live phone banking 
contact rate was 8.3 percent.
The voters One Arizona successfully 
engaged during the 2012 general election 
campaign were statistically significantly 
more likely to vote than those One Arizona 
attempted to contact but were unable to 
reach; this holds true across the entire range 
of vote propensities. The data also shows 
that the low-propensity voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged were significantly 
more likely to vote than similar voters in 
Maricopa and Pima counties who were 
outside of the coalition’s target universe.
During the 2012 general campaign, One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts increased 
turnout among low-propensity voters by a 
robust 13.6 percent: Whereas 48.4 percent of 
low-propensity voters in Maricopa County 
and Pima County turned out during the 
2012 general election, 62.0 percent of the 
low-propensity voters whom One Arizona 
successfully engaged cast ballots.31 
When focusing the analysis on low-
propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the data 
shows an even stronger increase in turnout 
of a robust 19.6 percent: 41.5 percent of 
low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters in 
Maricopa County and Pima County voted, 
against 61.1 percent of the low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters whom One Arizona 
successfully engaged.
In addition, by adapting and allowing different 
strategies based on available resources, One 
Arizona was able to streamline and focus 
efforts. Partners became more willing to assess 
realistic capacity, coordinate operations more 
cohesively, and provide support to each other.
29. Based on 322,657 voters for whom data is available. 
30. Based on 315,625 voters for whom data is available. 
31. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.
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In 2013, One Arizona was markedly better 
organized and more strategic, playing an 
important role in local elections. 
During the municipal primary campaign 
in Phoenix, One Arizona made 129,554 
attempted contacts to 33,456 unique 
voters; 92.4 percent were Hispanic/Latino.32 
Attempted contacts focused on door-to-door 
canvassing and live phone banking, with 
door-to-door canvassing accounting for 42.9 
percent of attempted contacts and live phone 
banking accounting for the rest. The door-to-
door canvassing contact rate was 31.3 percent; 
the live phone-banking rate was 19.4 percent. 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout among targeted voters by 
8.5 percent and among targeted Hispanic/
Latino voters by 12.1 percent.
In the general election campaign, One 
Arizona made 73,369 attempted contacts 
to 33,864 unique voters; 89.8 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino.33 Attempted contacts 
focused on door-to-door canvassing and live 
phone banking, with door-to-door canvassing 
accounting for 58.8 percent of attempted 
contacts and live phone banking making up 
the rest. The door-to-door canvassing contact 
rate was 37.4 percent; the live phone banking 
contact rate was 11.7 percent.
The results suggest that, when analyzing all 
voters, One Arizona’s engagement efforts in 
the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix 
did not increase turnout among targeted 
voters. However, when focusing on Hispanic/
Latino voters, the data shows that One 
Arizona increased turnout among targeted 
Latino voters by 6.5 percent. 
Latino voters in 
Phoenix increased 
their participation over 
previous years, largely 
owing to efforts to boost 
registration for the 
Permanent Early Voting 
List. In 2013, early voting 
accounted for close to 90 
percent of all votes cast 
in the city of Phoenix.
2013: Maturing infrastructure, powerful 
coalition and coordination, expanded scope
32. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,456 voters. 
33. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,864 voters.
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In 2014, One Arizona moved to expand its focus 
from Arizona’s Latino electorate to encompass 
the New American Majority—a “Latino Plus” 
universe that includes unmarried women, 
young people, and people of color more 
broadly. The campaign, recognizing the value 
of early-voting registration, focused on signing 
up this larger universe of voters; One Arizona 
partners collaborated to sign up 10,000 current 
voters along with more than 13,000 new voters. 
This represented a bright spot in a down year: 
Nationwide, 2014 saw the lowest turnout of any 
election year since the early 1950s, and Latino 
voting numbers fell correspondingly. 
Still, One Arizona took real steps, helping to 
form the Arizona Student Vote Coalition, a 
laboratory of sorts to innovate and test the 
potential power of the student vote; One 
Arizona offered the networks, partnerships, and 
skills necessary to bring it to fruition. With voter 
suppression on the rise, the coalition continued 
voter protection and education efforts through 
its voter guide and poll monitoring. 
During the 2014 general election campaign, 
One Arizona made 551,270 attempted contacts 
to 231,565 unique voters; 97.8 percent of these 
unique voters were in Maricopa County and 
Pima County.34 Some 62.1 percent of the unique 
voters targeted during the 2014 general election 
were low-propensity voters;35 74.9 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino, and 17.7 percent were Caucasian.
The low-propensity voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged were significantly more likely 
to vote than those in Maricopa and Pima counties 
who were outside the coalition’s target universe. 
However, the high-propensity voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged were significantly less likely 
to vote than those in Maricopa and Pima counties 
outside of One Arizona’s target universe. 
The data indicates that One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts during the 2014 campaign 
increased turnout among low-propensity 
voters by a robust 6.1 percent: Only 16.4 percent 
of low-propensity voters in Maricopa and 
Pima counties voted during the 2014 general 
election, against 22.5 percent of those whom 
One Arizona successfully engaged.36 
For low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters, 
the data shows an even 
stronger 13.2 percent 
increase in turnout: 
Whereas just 9.4 percent 
of low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters 
in Maricopa and Pima 
counties voted during the 
2014 general election, 22.6 
percent of those whom 
One Arizona successfully 
engaged cast ballots.
The coalition took steps to build capacity for 
future elections, hiring a part-time data staff to 
enter all voter registration, vote-by-mail signups, 
and pledge cards collected in the field, giving 
organizers a more accurate real-time analysis of 
its work on the ground.
2014: Expanded vision and power with
“Latino Plus” 
34. Based on 215,527 voters for whom data is available.  
35. Based on 215,534 voters for whom data is available. 
36. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.
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Heading into its fifth year of civic 
engagement work, the One Arizona table 
looked to expand the power and influence 
of low-propensity Latino voters and Latino 
Plus voters in Arizona. In 2015, in both an 
odd-year municipal election and during
a primary election that generally draws 
fewer voters, the coalition came out in 
force in Phoenix. 
In Phoenix, during the municipal primary 
campaign, the coalition made 112,171 
attempted contacts to 67,074 unique voters; 
58.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino, and
29.8 percent were Caucasian.37 Door-to-
door canvassing comprised nearly all of 
One Arizona’s attempted contacts during 
the 2015 municipal primary election in 
Phoenix; the canvassing contact rate was 
22.3 percent. 
The data indicates that 
the coalition’s voter 
engagement efforts 
increased turnout 
among targeted voters 
by 11.1 percent; when 
focusing the analysis on 
Hispanic/Latino voters, 
turnout rose a robust 
17.1 percent.
In Tucson, One Arizona made 28,444 attempted 
contacts to 19,380 unique voters; 73.8 percent 
were Hispanic/Latino, while 21.5 percent were 
Caucasian.38 Attempted contacts focused 
exclusively on door-to-door canvassing; the 
canvassing contact rate was 31.4 percent. 
2015: Enthusiasm, hope, solidarity, 
One Arizona wins and holds ground
37. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 67,074 voters. 
38. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 19,380 voters.
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From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona representatives 
made 3,004,804 attempted voter engagements,39 
with door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, 
and mailers40 comprising 91 percent of these 
attempts. Out of all outreach attempts during 
the period under evaluation, the coalition 
made 1,046,357 successful voter contacts,41 a 
contact rate of 35 percent. 
From these outreach efforts, One Arizona 
successfully engaged 364,677 unique voters. 
Figure 1 depicts all of the coalition’s outreach 
attempts during the period under evaluation, 
by mode of contact.
Summary of 2010 - 2015
39. 2,078 voters are marked as canvassed in the data but have no contact type entered. 
40. This includes traditional bulk mail, as well as 3,511 postcards mailed in 2011.
41. Contacts refer to voters that have been canvassed by One Arizona. It also includes the “mailed” result code but excludes 
all other result codes.
Figure 1.
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42. Data on race and ethnicity is available for 107,426 voters.
43. As with most academic debates, there is no consensus in the literature. For an early review, see Paul Gronke, et al., 
“Convenience voting,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008), pp. 437-55, www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/
Gronke2008-Convenience_Voting.pdf.
44. For example, see Sean Richey, “Voting by Mail: Turnout and Institutional Reform in Oregon,” Social Science Quarterly 89.4 
(2008), pp. 902-15. For a contrasting view, see Barry C. Burden, et al., “Election laws, mobilization, and turnout: The 
unanticipated consequences of election reform,” American Journal of Political Science 58.1 (2014), pp. 95-109, http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Ohio559.pdf. 
45. Thad Kousser and Megan Mullin, “Does voting by mail increase participation? Using matching to analyze a natural 
experiment,” Political Analysis 15.4 (2007), pp. 428-45. For further research, see Kevin Arceneaux, Thad Kousser, and 
Megan Mullin, “Get out the vote-by-mail? A randomized field experiment testing the effect of mobilization in traditional 
and vote-by-mail precincts,” Political Research Quarterly 65.4 (2012), pp. 882-94, http://pages.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/
PRQ%20Get%20Out%20the%20Vote%20by%20Mail.pdf.
46. Peter Miller and Sierra Powell, “Overcoming Voting Obstacles: The Use of Convenience Voting by Voters With 
Disabilities,” American Politics Research 44.1 (2016), pp. 28-55.
Permanent Early Voting List 
During the period under evaluation, One Arizona 
had 256,983 total engagements, or contacts 
(encouraging people to sign up for PEVL, or 
encouraging those already on PEVL to actually 
vote) with 117,464 unique voters regarding vote-
by-mail and/or early voting. Three-quarters of 
those voters, more than 80,000, were Hispanic/
Latino.42 This takes on added significance as 
advocates continue to see vote-by-mail and 
other early voting methods as concrete ways 
to address some of the obstacles to voting that 
voters of color and in particular low-income 
voters of color face.43  Vote-by-mail has been 
shown to increase turnout in not only presidential 
and midterm elections44 but also in local 
elections45 and among people with disabilities.46
Total Percent
Latino 81,374 75.7
Caucasian 21,040 19.6
Other/Unknown 3,028 2.8
African-American 1,201 1.1
Asian 684 0.6
Table 2.  ONE Arizona Voter 
Engagement/Contact 
Demographics
Out of the more 
than 80,000 unique 
Hispanic/Latino voters 
the coalition has 
engaged regarding 
vote-by-mail and/
or early voting, 61.4 
percent are low-
propensity or newly 
registered voters. 
In other words, One 
Arizona has used vote-
by-mail to address 
obstacles to voting 
for nearly 50,000 low-
propensity Hispanic/
Latino voters.
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Voter Engagement by Year
Figure 2 shows how One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts have evolved. As the figure 
shows, coalition groups were most active during 
the SB 1070 debate. In 2010, One Arizona made 
1,159,018 outreach attempts, accounting for 37.8 
percent of all attempted voter engagements 
during the period under evaluation. These 
outreach attempts resulted in 652,249 successful 
voter contacts, which accounts for 62.2 percent of 
all contacts during this period. Moreover, these 
contacts were made with 232,442 unique voters, 
accounting for 63.5 percent of all of the unique 
voters One Arizona engaged during this period. Figure 2.
Door-to-Door Canvassing
From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 1,095,413 door knocks, leading to 214,698 successful voter 
engagements with 125,949 unique voters. Table 3 shows the evolution of the coalition’s “ground game.”
Year Attempts Contacts
Contacts/
Attempts
Unique 
Voters 
Engaged*
Unique 
Voters 
Engaged/
Contacts
New 
Unique 
Voters 
Engaged
Approx. 
Funding 
Levels for 
OneAZ
2010 279,283 79,260 28.4% 53,443 67.4% 53,423 $1M
2011 92,902 21,575 23.2% 14,824 68.7% 8,330 $375K
2012 175,510 33,314 18.9% 26,570 79.8% 19,137 $425K
2013 112,088 24,298 21.7% 15,127 62.3% 8,707 $410K
2014 155,118 16,335 10.5% 14,942 91.5% 9,421 $550K
2015 280,512 39,916 14.2% 36,920 92.5% 26,931 $565K
Total 1,095,413 214,698 125,949 $3,325,000
Table 3.  2010-2015 Door-to-Door Canvassing Results
*Note: Sum for unique voter contacts by year does not equal total unique voters engaged via door-to-door canvassing 
because some voters canvassed one year were canvassed in previous years. See “new unique voters engaged” column. The 
number of new unique voters engaged in 2010 does not equal the number of unique voters engaged because One Arizona’s 
legacy data includes flags from prior to 2010.
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Door-to-Door Canvassing:
Contact Rates
As Table 3 further shows, in 2010, One 
Arizona made 279,283 door-to-door canvass 
attempts that resulted in 79,260 voter 
contacts with 53,443 unique voters. This 
represents a contact rate of 28.4 percent.47 
This also represents the high for the period 
under evaluation. Contact rates for door-
to-door canvassing vary widely across field 
programs and can fluctuate because of 
many factors, including canvassing in new 
turf (i.e., working in a neighborhood that 
an organization has not been in before), 
the experience of field program managers, 
the experience of canvassers, the turnover 
of canvassers, and the days and times that 
canvassing occurs, among other factors. 
Contact rates can also vary because of the 
salience of an election, among other political 
factors.
Door-to-Door Canvassing:
Unique Voters Engaged 
Table 3 also shows the percentage of unique 
voters engaged by One Arizona via door-to-
door canvassing. The percentage of unique 
voters engaged is reflective of the breadth 
of an organization’s ground game: A rising 
percentage indicates that an organization 
is having “many conversations with many 
voters.”48 Indeed, as the table shows, the 
percentage of unique voters engaged via 
door-to-door canvassing increased nearly 
year-to-year during the period under 
evaluation and reached its highest level in 
2015 at a full 92.5 percent. 
Door-to-Door Canvassing:
New Unique Voters Engaged 
Door-to-door canvassing can build 
relationships with voters whom an 
organization has not yet engaged; it can 
also deepen relationships with previously 
engaged voters. Most field programs are 
designed with both objectives in mind. One 
Arizona began building its base in 2010, and 
as Table 3 further shows, in each subsequent 
year, the balance of the coalition’s ground 
game has focused on broadening that base.49 
For example, in 2015, 72.9 percent of the 
unique voters engaged by One Arizona’s 
ground game were voters not canvassed in 
previous door-to-door field programs. The 
remaining 27.1 percent of the unique voters 
engaged served to deepen relationships.
47. Contact rate equals voter contacts divided by outreach attempts.
48. This contrasts with the approach of having multiple conversations with the same voters over the course of an 
election cycle.
49. That is, the percentage of new unique voters engaged divided by unique voters engaged exceeds 50 percent.
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50. Live phone calls excludes robocalls.
Live Phone Banking
From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 972,134 
live phone calls,50 leading to 84,951 voter 
engagements with 66,654 unique voters. 
The bulk of these live phone-banking efforts 
occurred in the context of SB 1070. In 2010, 
One Arizona made 352,833 live phone calls, 
accounting for 36.3 percent of all of the live 
calls made during the period under evaluation. 
These calls resulted in 46,087 successful voter 
engagements, accounting for 54.3 percent of all 
voter engagements made via live phone banking 
during this period. Table 4 shows the evolution of 
One Arizona’s live phone banking efforts.
Live Phone Banking: Contact Rates 
As Table 4 shows, the average contact rate for 
One Arizona’s live phone banking efforts is 8.7 
percent over the period. The rate reached a 
peak of 20.6 percent in 2011 but has generally 
decreased each year since 2010: For example, in 
2014, out of 285,183 live phone calls made, 12,113, 
or 4.2 percent, resulted in a successful voter 
engagement. Contact rates for One Arizona’s 
live phone banking efforts resemble those 
of live phone banking efforts elsewhere (and 
phone-based survey research more generally), 
as caller ID—and, therefore, screening of 
unfamiliar numbers—have become ubiquitous, 
along with cell-phone usage. 
Live Phone Banking:
New Unique Voters Engaged 
Despite its challenges, live phone banking has 
strongly complemented One Arizona’s ground 
game. Table 5 shows the number of new unique 
voters engaged by the coalition’s live phone 
banking efforts, distinguishing between voters 
who were called only and those who were called 
and walked via door-to-door canvassing efforts. 
As the table shows, live phone banking grew 
One Arizona’s base by 42,628 voters during the 
period under evaluation. 
Year Attempts Contacts
Contacts/
Attempts
2010 352,833 46,087 13.1%
2011 24,711 5,089 20.6%
2012 186,946 13,895 7.4%
2013 121,484 7,619 6.3%
2014 285,183 12,113 4.2%
2015 977 148 15.1%
Total 972,134 84,951 8.7%
Table 4.  2010-2015
Phone Banking Results
Year
Unique Voters 
Engaged: 
Called, Not 
Walked
Unique Voters 
Engaged: 
Called and 
Walked
2010 24,345 15,229
2011 1,350 1,834
2012 8,443 2,175
2013 2,130 2,915
2014 6,323 1,788
2015 37 85
Total 42,628 24,026
Table 5. Phone Banking: 
Unique Voters Engaged
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Looking Forward
PART THREE:
The state’s 
changing 
demographics 
are creating 
new and 
unprecedented 
opportunities 
to transform 
antagonistic 
rhetoric and 
policies into a 
more hopeful and 
democratic future 
for the majority of 
Arizona’s people. 
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Through the 2000s, as neighboring Colorado, 
Nevada, and New Mexico became more 
immigrant-friendly, Arizona has stayed mostly 
and consistently anti-immigrant. Elected officials 
such as Sheriff Arpaio are often in the media 
due to anti-immigrant acts and statements and 
have created an impression at the national level 
that Arizona is a strongly anti-immigrant state—
and likely to remain so. Yet this is only part of 
the story. Years of anti-immigrant politics have 
had a paradoxical effect on Latinos, creating 
uncertainty within families and communities 
but also politicizing and mobilizing these 
populations. Moreover, the state’s changing 
demographics are creating new opportunities 
for Latino voters to change the future of the 
state’s policies. Organizing for a more just 
and democratic future for Arizona requires an 
understanding of three factors: demographics, 
the Latino paradox, and the importance of 
investing in the state’s civic future.
Demographics: The Changing Arizona 
Electorate
According to the Pew Research Center, 
Arizona’s Latino population is the nation’s 
sixth-largest, with some 2.1 million Hispanics 
(3.7 percent of all U.S. Latinos) residing there. 
Arizona’s population is 31 percent Hispanic, 
the fourth-largest statewide population 
share.51 In addition to sheer growth, Arizona’s 
Latino population is twenty years younger 
than its non-Hispanic whites. 
Phoenix is now 40 percent Latino. Eight years 
ago, before I ran for office, there wasn’t one 
Latino on the council; we didn’t have a seat at 
the table. Once I got in, there came two others. 
The sleeping giant is growing in numbers—and 
voting numbers.
 –Elected official
However, demography is not destiny. Much of 
the gap between rates of electoral participation 
for Latino and non-Hispanic whites has to do 
with voter turnout. As scholars Louis DeSipio 
and Rodolfo de la Garza have noted, among 
all populations, “the young, the less well 
educated, and the low-income are less likely to 
vote. All of these groups are disproportionately 
represented among Latinos.”52 Getting 
younger, less affluent, less educated citizens 
to the polls is always a challenge, and large 
segments of the Latino community are part of 
these overlapping populations. 
In the 2012 presidential election, for example, 
there was a twenty-two-point turnout 
difference, with 62 percent of voting-
age whites going to the polls and only 40 
percent of eligible Latinos following suit; in 
other words, nearly 600,000 Latinos who 
were eligible to vote did not turn out.53 
From Anti-Immigrant Extremism 
to Latino Empowerment 
51. Gustavo López and Renee Stepler, “Latinos in the 2016 Election: Arizona,” Pew Research Center, January 19, 2016,       
http://pewrsr.ch/1JWuFZg.
52. Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo de la Garza, “Forever Seen as New: Latino Participation in American Elections,” in Latinos: 
Remaking America, edited by Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (University of California Press, 2002), 
pp. 398-409.
53. Sylvia Manzano, “Demographics and Immigration Politics in Arizona,” Latino Decisions, March 4, 2014, www.
latinodecisions.com/blog/2014/03/04/demographics-and-immigration-politics-in-arizona/.
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This is a huge untapped segment of the 
Arizona electorate. But as activists know 
firsthand, overcoming these impediments to 
participation requires personal, sustained, and 
targeted mobilization efforts. 
We’re approaching majority-minority status in 
the state by 2021, with people of color making 
up more and more legislative districts. The 
attacks have gone underground, and now 
we’re seeing a lot of voter suppression, with at 
least ten initiatives on the ballot to suppress 
the Latino vote. We are in a fight for power: 
They are doing everything they can to slow our 
growth. 
–Elected official
In sum, Arizona is well 
on its way to becoming a 
majority-minority state. 
The Latino population 
is growing rapidly, and 
this growth represents 
an unprecedented 
opportunity to 
transform the state’s 
political policies and 
priorities. There is 
enormous potential 
for transforming 
Arizona’s electorate. But 
significant resources 
are needed if the Latino 
vote is to achieve its 
promise. 
The Latino Paradox: Mobilizing Anger, 
Creating Solidarities, and Empowering 
Communities
While social-capital and civic engagement 
scholars often presume that political 
empowerment requires a community of 
citizens animated by feelings of optimism, 
belonging, and civic trust, the reality of how 
and why people become politicized and 
engaged is far more complicated. Racially 
charged legislation such as SB 1070 has made 
Latinos (regardless of citizenship status) 
feel under attack. In this way, attacks on the 
undocumented have also mobilized Latino 
citizen voters. If SB 1070 has taught Latinos 
anything, it’s that politics matters. Civic 
engagement isn’t just good citizenship—for 
many in our communities, it’s a matter of life 
and death. 
In Arizona, some of the most inspiring 
examples of how anti-immigrant sentiments 
and policies can be transformed into 
solidarity and social justice have come from 
undocumented youth, as many of them are 
leading members and active volunteers of the 
One Arizona table.
There are many individuals who are 
Dreamers, in the process of fixing their papers, 
and they’re knocking on doors in 110-degree 
temperatures, educating people on the right to 
vote, encouraging them to vote, getting their 
family members and neighbors to vote: I am 
here to encourage you as an American citizen 
to register to vote, to respect the laws of this 
great country, to know the important civic 
engagement of voting.
–One Arizona community partner
Dreamers and their allies successfully pressured 
President Obama into signing a 2012 executive 
order granting young undocumented 
immigrants “deferred action.” DACA 
(Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) allows 
immigrants under 30 years old who arrived as 
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children to apply for a deportation deferral and 
stay in the country legally. The implementation 
of DACA has thus far been a key policy victory 
and its existence is due primarily to the activism 
of the undocumented.
I’m a Dreamer, so doing this work is even more 
powerful for me. I graduated from high school 
and never thought I would be looking at a map of 
my city and strategizing with other organizations 
about how we would reach my community and 
raise the bar for voters in Arizona. It’s very 
empowering for me. You don’t have to be a 
mastermind or have degrees to make a change 
in the community and for our families. I am not 
able to vote, but I always say that every person 
who votes is voting for my family and me. They 
are the voice of my family and me.
–One Arizona community partner 
The fight for DACA offers three powerful 
lessons for the Latino communities in Arizona 
and elsewhere. One is that when it comes to 
Latino politics, empowerment is not just about 
the ballot box. Politics in the Latino community 
is about more than elections; noncitizens also 
have a major role to play. Their bravery and 
political creativity has inspired native-born 
and naturalized Latinos, creating an enhanced 
sense of solidarity and linked fate. In other 
words, when it comes to the civic life of the 
Latino community, citizenship is more than 
a status—it’s a practice, something you do in 
common with others. Undocumented activists 
in the One Arizona efforts have been some of 
the most politically active members, practicing 
a citizenship they do not yet have. 
The second lesson is that while there are 
important demographic distinction between 
Latinos who hold U.S. citizenship and those 
who do not, these populations have a great 
deal of connectivity. In Arizona, 65 percent of 
Latino voters in the state say they have friends 
or family members that are undocumented. 
With the announcement of the DACA/DAPA 
implementation, we have been able to 
bring together a group of people and 
have a subgroup, engaging people in the 
documentation process. 
–One Arizona community partner
And third, the aggressive anti-immigrant rhetoric 
of the current presidential election season is 
making it more likely that Arizona Latinos may 
experience a partisan shift in voting similar to 
what happened in California in the 1990s. In 
1994, the California ballot featured Proposition 
187, an initiative that called for denying health care 
and social services to unauthorized immigrants 
and their children. As with SB 1070, Proposition 
187 led to heated demonstrations on both sides; 
the organizing experience and mobilization 
surrounding the ballot measure led to increased 
rates of naturalization and voting among Latinos.54 
Even more significantly, results from studies 
undertaken during the 1990s show that Latinos 
who naturalized and registered to vote after 
1994 remain more likely to vote than Latinos who 
registered during less politically charged periods.55 
If SB 1070 has taught 
Latinos anything, it’s 
that politics matters. 
Civic engagement 
isn’t just good 
citizenship—for many 
in our communities, 
it’s a matter of life 
and death.
54. See Lisa García Bedolla, Latino Politics, 2nd edition (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2014), p. 240. 
55. Ibid., p. 243. 
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Investing in Democracy:
Arizona’s Civic Future 
Promoting democratic civic engagement 
within communities that have experienced 
widespread discrimination and 
disenfranchisement is never easy. The 
challenges are multiple. Newly naturalized 
Latinos require extra efforts to educate and 
familiarize them with political institutions 
different from their countries of origin. 
And as noted earlier, Latino voters are 
overrepresented among demographic groups 
with lower voter turnout—those who are 
young, poorer, and with less formal education. 
Yet real change in voter turnout is possible. 
In Colorado, President Obama’s Latino 
vote share increased by 14 points between 
2008 and 2012. According to U.C. Berkeley 
political scientist Lisa García Bedolla, 
electoral success in states like Colorado 
and California was the result of a sustained 
investment in building and supporting this 
emerging Latino electorate: “Organizers 
on the ground…went into the field early, 
coordinated and maintained a continual 
presence on Spanish-language media.… 
Similar efforts occurred across the country 
and demonstrate the importance of 
direct organization and mobilization in 
order to ensure Latinos are sufficiently 
represented at the ballot box.… The lesson 
from November 2012 is that only through 
sustained organization, mobilization, and 
coordination can Latinos realize their full 
electoral potential.”56 
56. Bedolla, Latino Politics, pp. 248-49. 
Vision Forward: 
What’s Next?
Stakeholder interviews point to some key 
considerations in preparing for the next leg of 
One Arizona’s future, and in shaping its impact. 
First and foremost are factors that are internal 
to One Arizona: raising the needed resources 
to grow its internal capacity, remaining 
focused on growing the Latino electorate 
while expanding to include the New American 
Majority, finding new and creative ways to 
reach people, devising a system to more 
intentionally track and measure leadership 
development, and building partner capacity.
The second set of areas is more external: 
expansion to other corners of the state, 
incorporating students, and securing 
consistent funding.
Pay attention to strengthening         
One Arizona
Between 2010 and 2015, One Arizona received 
approximately $3,325,000 from private 
funders and donors to support its field 
operations as well as core operating funding. 
This has allowed One Arizona to reach its 
current level of success. In the long term, it 
would serve the coalition to think through 
its financial sustainability model, starting 
with: Who should fund One Arizona? And 
what does the ideal funding pie look like—
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for instance, what percentage of funding 
would organizers like to see from private 
foundations, local foundations, local donors, 
labor, grassroots donors and supporters, and 
public funding sources?
Also, while funders have lifted One Arizona 
to a high level of effectiveness, there’s no 
question that gaps persist between capacity 
and need. 
Everyone is stretched really thin. We need 
resources to build out staff to actually manage 
the programs. We have to have that to grow. 
I’m doing three jobs. This is not sustainable. 
–One Arizona founding partner
Being a national funder, our job is to help 
find local supporters to sustain these projects, 
and these organizations are not yet terribly 
successful at engaging local funders. Immigrant 
rights may not the most effective frame to reach 
the local philanthropic community—perhaps 
they should frame their efforts as working 
toward integration and with the DACA 
program: Once people have legal status, how 
can we work together to give them education 
and be self-sufficient?
–One Arizona funder partner
Apart from attracting external support for 
individual programs, those programs need 
staff capacity to execute, making core-
operating support the cornerstone of any 
social sector organization’s effectiveness. 
And it’s more challenging to find funding for 
core operations than for program support—
or for midterm election year campaigning. 
We knew that in order for us to build 
political power, we needed to build the 
infrastructure and the capacity of people who 
can do this work. We need to have year-round 
engagement—the table would not work if it 
functioned only at election times. Building 
people power is not episodic, not transactional 
or opportunistic. 
–One Arizona founding partner
This is not about an election-year outcome. 
We need to show the importance of starting 
early, and not just episodically. We need to be 
on campus by January of election year, so we 
can build our relationships and be ready for the 
fall. We need trained staff who already have 
relationships.
–One Arizona schools partner
As One Arizona increases its electoral power 
and influence, the more organizations and 
community members expect it to do. It’s 
also an additional challenge for the coalition 
to not be perceived as going after funding 
that might otherwise go to one or more of its 
members. 
I see partners operating with little resources, 
having to sell their services as a commodity. 
There’s not enough room for them to grow 
and prosper. My aspiration for them is to 
have more of a cushion to engage in long-term 
development around communities and not have 
to respond to short-term funding imperatives so 
much. 
–One Arizona consultant and adviser
Between 2010 and 2015, 
One Arizona received 
approximately 
$3,325,000 from 
private funders and 
donors to support its 
field operations as 
well as core operating 
funding.
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Both/and: Continue to expand the 
Latino electorate while growing to 
include a New American Majority
One Arizona formed with a core mission to 
expand the Latino electorate. As the coalition 
matured, expanding to include new young 
and women voters made sense, since each 
block that canvassers cover includes a mix 
of Latino and new voters. Five years in, One 
Arizona appears relatively successful in 
nurturing its roots while adding new voters. 
We have been managing the expansion very 
carefully so we don’t lose our base focus. I don’t 
hear a lot of pushback when we talk about the 
New American Majority, since we are talking 
about predominantly Latino groups anyway.
–One Arizona staffer
It helps build our credibility to reach more 
demographic and geographic areas, more areas 
of the state. It sets us up to move in the future.
–Focus group participant
This doesn’t mean that One Arizona’s 
expansion has lacked tension. In particular, 
some founding members worry about 
watering down the coalition’s original focus. 
Others see the expanded parameters as a 
way to strengthen and evolve the purpose of 
broadening the electorate. 
My vision for One Arizona’s future is getting 
back to the roots, retaining a focus on Latino 
community engagement, and fighting anti-
immigrant sentiment and laws. In growing we are 
becoming more inclusive, yet the need remains.
–One Arizona founding partner 
I think the founding organizations had a 
purpose of why they came together: to fight 
back against anti-immigrant sentiment and 
legislation. We should work with other people, 
but it doesn’t make sense for us to expand the 
work. I would hate to do what others do to us: 
parachute in if we are not representative of that 
community. Things go best when those impacted 
from that community are doing the work.
–One Arizona founding partner 
In actual implementation, it would bode well 
for One Arizona to be deliberate about how 
it deepens existing civic engagement work 
in Latino and immigrant communities as it 
expands its reach to engage students, women, 
and other groups.
There is some value in staying grounded in the 
Latino community but also in working with 
other groups, because that is the electorate that 
we need to win.
–One Arizona community partner
Of course, increasing Latinos in the overall 
electorate and voice is key. But the Latino 
vote alone can’t bring about more inclusive 
and immigrant-friendly policies. Expanding 
the coalition’s original focus by adding New 
American Majority voters is ultimately about 
furthering more pro-immigrant and inclusive 
policies that benefit all Arizonians. 
In Arizona, you’re going to have a hard time 
actualizing progressive policies if you don’t 
do bridge work and get the support of more 
moderate voices. 
–One Arizona community partner
If we’re trying to get bigger numbers, why are 
we skipping unmarried woman at this house 
and young voters at this house when we can 
hit all of them on the same block? If we can get 
more votes on the board and continue to add to 
the Latino-focused programs, why pass them 
by? To me, that’s dumb. 
–One Arizona founding partner
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Test a proactive policy agenda
When asked about their vision for One 
Arizona, stakeholders are clear that the 
table and its partners have become a viable, 
effective infrastructure for civic engagement; 
they want to reach a turning point where 
the efforts of the table gain ground and 
move forward policies that benefit Latinos, 
immigrants, and other identity groups. 
In dealing with undocumented issues, it seems like 
there’s a culture shift, particularly in Phoenix, 
from hostile to willing to at least discuss. But that 
has not yet translated to new policies.
–One Arizona founding member
The state is still introducing anti-immigrant 
laws, but we have collectively been able to 
slow these down and mostly block them. The 
urgency here is to flip the coin and introduce 
pro-immigrant policies and laws. Obviously 
we have a lot of work to do—we are still being 
reactive rather than proactive.
–One Arizona community partner
Despite the political landscape in Arizona 
remaining adversarial to Latino and immigrant 
communities, stakeholders see the logical 
outcome of One Arizona’s growth trajectory to 
be a shift from a necessary reactive position to a 
more proactive position. They also understand 
the need to consolidate their strengths for the 
battles to come, and to continue to cultivate the 
foundation for that shift. 
I see the vision getting bigger and bigger every 
year so that we can change things around 2020. 
Our operations are getting more youth-driven, 
getting youth involved sooner rather than later, 
making new traditions within their own families. 
2020 will be huge for us to show the muscle we 
have as Latinos at the polls. Given the adversity 
we have faced politically, the whole country will 
say: If Arizona can do it, then we can too.
–One Arizona founding member
Granted, developing a proactive policy 
agenda for a coalition is easier said than done, 
since inevitably, member organizations don’t 
see eye-to-eye on every priority and issue. 
I want to see One Arizona stay focused and not 
expand into so many issues. Expanding voter 
registration is the ticket to change all these 
other issues we care about.
–Focus group participant 
We’ve tried to keep controversial issues away 
from One Arizona. I’ve been a strong advocate 
to stick with voter engagement, focusing on 
Latino voters because there’s not another place 
for Latino voters that is a home. I advocate for 
staying in that space. Individual organizations 
can build on the foundation we’ve built, and 
folks can choose whether or not to participate.
–One Arizona founding member
If One Arizona moves in the direction of 
setting a policy agenda, it may want to 
experiment with one or two before moving 
on to more. As a table, it will need to tread 
very carefully to preserve what it has built. 
“2020 will be huge for 
us to show the muscle 
we have as Latinos at 
the polls. Given the 
adversity we have 
faced politically, the 
whole country will 
say: If Arizona can do 
it, then we can too.”
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Regenerate excitement by being more 
creative in engaging voters
As One Arizona sits on the verge of 
expansion, stakeholders want to see 
the table get creative in reaching and 
engaging the electorate to evolve its 
established tactics. 
We talk about how it’s hard to get Latino 
families out to events. I was at my kid’s ballet 
folklorico practice, but neither I nor any of 
the thirty other moms were at our kids’ school 
board meetings. It’s important to use different 
ways of engaging people, celebrating people, 
defining who we are, saying this is the Arizona 
we want to live in.
–One Arizona schools partner
I would like us to do voter festivals, rallies, and 
marches—visible expressions of power—and 
also empowering the youth and showing that 
change is happening. 
–One Arizona founding partner
Knocking on doors is the least engaging way to 
take real ownership and responsibility to vote. 
We need to move to community-driven policy 
campaigns.
–One Arizona community partner
Strengthen an intentional
leadership-development ladder
Stakeholders maintain that developing young 
leaders through One Arizona’s infrastructure 
is one of its biggest accomplishments, and 
that replicating leadership is both an ingrained 
cultural practice in the collaborative and the 
key to its future. Stakeholders want to see this 
work measured and tracked to more accurately 
capture and understand success in this area. 
Civic engagement is a great environment for 
leadership development work, with lots of 
opportunities for shared leadership. We create 
opportunities for people to take responsibility 
and grow as leaders. It’s not just about building 
an electorate—it’s about building an engaged 
group of leaders who are taking responsibility 
for their community. That’s more important 
than the electoral outcomes, because democracy 
is about regular, consistent dialogue and 
engagement and people taking responsibility. 
That’s what makes democracy dynamic vibrant 
and powerful, not voting once or twice a year.
–One Arizona staffer
One Arizona Executive Director Ian Danley 
suggests the following indicators to measure 
developing young leaders: “Input: volunteer 
engagement, and volunteers that convert 
to leadership or staff. On the front end, 
“It’s not just 
about building an 
electorate—it’s 
about building an 
engaged group of 
leaders who are 
taking responsibility 
for their community. 
That’s more 
important than the 
electoral outcomes, 
because democracy 
is about regular, 
consistent dialogue 
and engagement 
and people taking 
responsibility.” 
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if there are not a significant number of 
volunteer leaders, then you won’t have 
robust leadership. Output: how much young 
leaders are taking on responsibility and 
leadership within the organization. This 
is an important outcome to measure. Are 
they taking leadership in the community 
in broader terms? Are young leaders 
being prepared and seeing themselves as 
potential candidates?”
Another key measure of leadership 
development is young leaders within the 
collaborative expressing interest in running 
for elected office. This is grounded in the 
importance of who controls the local political 
arena and the significance of people from 
Latino and immigrant communities stepping 
out front to take responsibility for the 
community as a whole. 
We need more of our people to run for office. 
More of us need to be in office. Personally, 
I have gone from absolutely not to maybe. I 
used to joke that only two types of people run 
for office, the climbers and too-idealistic types 
of people. That opinion has changed in the 
last couple of years.
–One Arizona community partner 
If you don’t run, someone else is going to, and 
they may or may not be connected to our values 
and our movement. “Astroturf” candidates 
may come in and suck up the resources in the 
spaces of power that we have created. We need 
our people to see themselves as candidates. Our 
movement values are more important than our 
progressive values, because they are rooted in 
the relationships of our communities and the 
humans we are fighting for. It’s not abstract.
–One Arizona staff
Expand to other parts of the state 
methodically
One Arizona may be a victim of its own 
success when it comes to expanding its 
work statewide. There is broad agreement 
among stakeholders that geographic 
expansion of One Arizona’s reach is the 
next frontier. 
They have done very successful work in 
Phoenix. It’s easy for me to say to get more 
involved statewide, beyond pockets in Phoenix, 
Tucson, and Mesa, but they can change the 
entire state. If we can get Latinos voting at 
the rate of the average of the state, we will see 
much more progressive, pro-human legislators 
and legislation. That would be a beautiful gift 
to the state of Arizona. It’s tough work, but 
One Arizona can do it.
–Elected official
One Arizona is the coalition to get the state 
to tip, to convert folks into voters and help 
mastermind a statewide strategy. With several 
hundred thousand early voters signed up and 
motivated, we can shift who’s elected to the 
state legislature. The key is building bridges 
among communities—Latinos, labor, pro-
choice—as one united front.
–One Arizona founding member
“More of us need to 
be in office.... I used 
to joke that only 
two types of people 
run for office, the 
climbers and too- 
idealistic types of 
people. That opinion 
has changed in the 
last couple of years.”
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The idea of partnering with existing groups 
to extend its reach may be a long-term, 
sustainable strategy.
I’d love to see a truly statewide infrastructure 
in at least three other counties, with a table 
that includes not just Latinos but all kinds of 
underrepresented communities: black, Native, 
poor white, people with disabilities, young people. 
–One Arizona community partner 
Pay attention to building the capacity 
of partner organizations, especially 
those more nascent
Stakeholder interviews point to the uneven 
capacity and longevity of organizations at 
the table. Some younger or more specialized 
organizations have less ability to bring in votes 
but are nevertheless valuable partners, doing 
meaningful work. 
The usual thing that happens with coalitions is 
the table grows but individual organizations’ 
capacity doesn’t. There could be more of a 
focus on building individual organizations to 
grow, even though it is comfortable to allow the 
table to do things for you.
–One Arizona founding partner
Stakeholders highlight the informal learning 
and mentorship, the sharing of resources that 
happens among organizations at the table; 
they stress that the table will be stronger 
when individual partners are strengthened. 
The questions, then: What potential does the 
table structure itself offer for institutionalizing 
more targeted capacity-building for table 
partners? How best to groom and develop 
organizations along with their young leaders? 
How can the table do an even better job at 
recognizing and being more intentional about 
the continuum of organizational capacities 
present in the collaborative? How can it 
foster a mutual exchange of information and 
expertise between smaller or more specialized 
organizations and the larger traditional 
civic engagement powers? The table’s 
health is directly linked to that of its partner 
organizations. 
Our organization is in transition from being 
100 percent volunteer to a combination of 
staff and volunteers, but my capacity is still 
limited. As a table, we haven’t figured out 
how to help organizations with weaknesses. 
New organizations get fewer resources than 
more established organizations, and I don’t 
understand why this is. We have a more 
critical need.
–One Arizona community partner
Fortify strategic partnerships to 
advance civic engagement in schools
In interviews, stakeholders point proudly 
to One Arizona’s partnership with Arizona 
Student Vote Coalition. Educators and 
One Arizona partners alike are hopeful and 
excited about the potential returns from this 
partnership, the number of voters who can be 
activated in schools, and the young people 
and families who can be reached in this way. 
Yet there is room for more buy-in, more 
commitment from the table and from funders 
to support this partnership in becoming a 
bridge to One Arizona’s future—the new 
majority. There is work to be done in capturing 
the lessons learned that are unique to this 
partnership, to civic engagement in high 
schools and community colleges. And there 
are clear ties to the DACA/DAPA work taking 
place throughout the state.
When I talk to educators, we see a continuum of 
civic engagement: Voting is actually an outcome 
at the end of the continuum—only a small piece. 
With DACA, we have a real opportunity—tens 
of thousands of students in public schools today 
are immediately eligible or will be eligible soon, 
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and we need to take advantage. So we had four 
forums last year; the smallest was seven people, 
and the largest was over a hundred families who 
came to our school.
–One Arizona schools partner
Showing the table the success of civic 
engagement among the youth vote in schools 
has brought more buy-in, and I don’t believe 
that expanding to young people will detract 
from Latino issues or community. I believe 
students support Latino issues, LGBTQ issues, 
and working-family issues.
–One Arizona schools partner
We are leading all One Arizona members in 
voter registration right now, with no funding 
other than my salary. In terms of cost-
effectiveness, it’s more effective than door-to-
door, and people vote at twice the rate. I want 
to raise up the importance of cross-training, 
of building sustainability and longevity. One 
Arizona can be part of that for the student 
movement, and student work can do that for 
One Arizona.
–One Arizona schools partner
Importance of continued and 
consistent funding
Stakeholders recognize the value of the steady 
resources funders have provided to build 
the collaborative. Having early and reliable 
funding has played a critical role in One 
Arizona’s success. Sustaining those resources 
and expanding the funder base will be a 
core need as the coalition undertakes the 
next leg of its journey. Consistency is key, Ian 
Danley notes: “It’s really challenging to not 
know what funders’ commitments are and to 
try and build a plan around hypothetical or 
aspirational budgets, especially when funders 
make decisions late about where they are 
going to contribute.”
Without the money, we wouldn’t have the 
ambitions we have now. It’s given us the 
ability to dream big. It’s like being a parent: 
Your love is unconditional, then your 
children grow up to be hopeful and confident. 
If there isn’t that type of support, they have 
fewer ambitions.
–One Arizona founding member
Funders know that if you create durable 
capacity, that’s where the opportunity for 
innovation lies, because that allows several 
organizations to engage in healthy competition, 
and that’s more likely to develop best practices.
–One Arizona founding member
I’d like for other funders to think about 
developing organizations at the same time 
as the coalition, encouraging and funding 
nontraditional forms of civic engagement and 
knowing that Arizona is important, that it 
is the battleground for LGBTQ and other 
issues. Winning here is winning in the rest of 
the country.
–One Arizona founding member
“[Money]  has given 
us the ability to 
dream big. It’s like 
being a parent: Your 
love is unconditional, 
then your children 
grow up to be hopeful 
and confident. If 
there isn’t that type 
of support, they have 
fewer ambitions.”
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Conclusion
For years, Arizona has been the key battleground 
in the national fight over immigration—setting 
the debate and tone for the rest of the country, 
acting as a home for both the anti-immigration 
movement and America’s emerging Latino 
electorate. This constant creep of anti-
immigration rhetoric and the ongoing threat of 
attacks—legal, political, and cultural—have fired 
up an activism and awareness in response. In 2010, 
for Latinos, Arizona was a bad place. In a very 
short time, One Arizona has played a leading 
role in turning that around. 
Owing to One Arizona’s efforts, elected officials 
and governing bodies are now awake to the 
significance of the concerns and issues of formerly 
low-propensity Latino voters. They understand that 
this is not a population that can be dismissed—on 
the contrary, it is now a force that must be taken 
into account in electoral campaigns and races. 
Elected officials and governing bodies must now 
be responsive to a broader segment of Arizona’s 
voting population; this translates into real systemic 
change and a transformed political landscape. 
Flipping this state is ripe as anywhere in 
the country. How quickly we can accelerate 
that growth is only a matter of time. Once 
we flip it blue, it will stay blue. We have the 
strength and organization to lead the nation in 
progressive politics.
–One Arizona community partner
The numbers are there. Legal permanent 
residents are more eager than ever to become 
citizens, citizens anxious to become voters, 
and voters ready to participate in elections 
that will reflect their collective political 
power—not only to their local leaders but to 
the entire nation. 
Concretely, One Arizona has changed the 
way Latinos and other low-propensity voters 
see democracy, their place in the democratic 
process, their voice, and their power; One 
Arizona’s efforts have expanded the Latino 
electorate, brought more New American 
Majority voters to the polls, and transformed 
the way previous low-propensity voters to vote. 
Honestly, I believe everything One Arizona 
is developing is exactly the way we planned 
it in 2010. We couldn’t have figured out the 
curves and detours, but we envisioned a table 
that would exist for a long time, enhance 
cooperation, increase Latino engagement, and 
bring in young people. This was our vision 
back in 2010.
–One Arizona founding partner
Rather than setting an example for restrictive 
anti-immigrant policies, Arizona is poised to 
become a model for Latino civic engagement 
and political empowerment of the new 
majority. One Arizona and its stakeholders 
are modeling to the rest of the country how 
to fight back with vision, persistence and grit. 
The country is better because of it.
Legal permanent 
residents are more 
eager than ever to 
become citizens, 
citizens anxious 
to become voters, 
and voters ready to 
participate in elections 
that will reflect their 
collective political 
power—not only to 
their local leaders but 
to the entire nation. 
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APPENDIX 1:
1. One Arizona Voter Engagement
From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 
3,004,804 attempted voter engagements.1 
Door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, 
and mailers2 make up 90.8 percent of 
these outreach attempts. Out of all 
outreach attempts during the period 
under evaluation, One Arizona made 
1,046,357 successful voter contacts,3 
which translates into a contact rate of 
34.9 percent. Because the inclusion of 
mailers increases contact rates, door-to-
door canvassing and phone banking are 
separately analyzed below. 364,677 unique 
voters have been engaged by One Arizona. 
Figure 1 depicts all of One Arizona’s 
outreach attempts during the period under 
evaluation by mode of contact.
1. 2,078 voters are marked as canvassed in the data but have no contact type entered. 
2. This includes traditional bulk mail, as well as 3,511 postcards mailed in 2011.
3. Contacts refer to voters that have been canvassed by One Arizona. It also includes the “mailed” result code but excludes 
all other result codes.
Complete Voter Engagement, Turnout, and 
PEVL Data
364,677 unique 
voters have been 
engaged by
One Arizona.
Figure 1.
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1.1  Voter Engagement by Year
Figure 2 shows how One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts have evolved. As the figure 
shows, coalition groups were most active during 
the SB 1070 debate. In 2010, One Arizona made 
1,159,018 outreach attempts, accounting for 37.8 
percent of all attempted voter engagements 
during the period under evaluation. These 
outreach attempts resulted in 652,249 successful 
voter contacts, which accounts for 62.2 percent of 
all contacts during this period. Moreover, these 
contacts were made with 232,442 unique voters, 
accounting for 63.5 percent of all of the unique 
voters One Arizona engaged during this period. Figure 2.
1.2  Voter Engagement by Type: Door-to-Door Canvassing
From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 1,095,413 door knocks, leading to 214,698 successful voter 
engagements with 125,949 unique voters. Table 1 shows the evolution of the coalition’s “ground game.”
Year Attempts Contacts
Contacts/
Attempts
Unique 
Voters 
Engaged*
Unique 
Voters 
Engaged/
Contacts
New 
Unique 
Voters 
Engaged
Approx. 
Funding 
Levels for 
OneAZ
2010 279,283 79,260 28.4% 53,443 67.4% 53,423 $1M
2011 92,902 21,575 23.2% 14,824 68.7% 8,330 $375K
2012 175,510 33,314 18.9% 26,570 79.8% 19,137 $425K
2013 112,088 24,298 21.7% 15,127 62.3% 8,707 $410K
2014 155,118 16,335 10.5% 14,942 91.5% 9,421 $550K
2015 280,512 39,916 14.2% 36,920 92.5% 26,931 $565K
Total 1,095,413 214,698 125,949 $3,325,000
Table 1.  2010-2015 Door-to-Door Canvassing Results
*Note: sum for unique voter contacts by year does not equal total unique voters engaged via door-to-door canvassing 
because some voters canvassed one year were canvassed in previous years. See “new unique voters engaged” column. The 
number of new unique voters engaged in 2010 does not equal the number of unique voters engaged because One Arizona’s 
legacy data includes flags from prior to 2010.
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1.2.1  Door-to-Door Contact Rates
As Table 1 further shows, in 2010, One Arizona 
made 279,283 door-to-door canvass attempts 
that resulted in 79,260 voter contacts with 
53,443 unique voters. This represents a 
contact rate of 28.4 percent.4 This also 
represents the high for the period under 
evaluation. Contact rates for door-to-door 
canvassing vary widely across field programs 
and can fluctuate because of many factors, 
including canvassing in new turf (i.e., working 
in a neighborhood that an organization 
has not been in before), the experience of 
field program managers, the experience of 
canvassers, the turnover of canvassers, and 
the days and times that canvassing occurs, 
among other factors. Contact rates can also 
vary because of the salience of an election, 
among other political factors.
1.2.2  Unique Voters Engaged via Door-
to-Door Canvassing
Table 1 also shows the percentage of unique 
voters engaged by One Arizona via door-to-
door canvassing. The percentage of unique 
voters engaged is reflective of the breadth 
of an organization’s ground game: A rising 
percentage indicates that an organization 
is having “many conversations with many 
voters.”5 Indeed, as the table shows, the 
percentage of unique voters engaged via 
door-to-door canvassing increased nearly 
year-to-year during the period under 
evaluation and reached its highest level in 
2015 at a full 92.5 percent. 
1.2.3  New Unique Voters Engaged via 
Door-to-Door Canvassing 
Door-to-door canvassing can build 
relationships with voters whom an 
organization has not yet engaged; it can 
also deepen relationships with previously 
engaged voters. Most field programs are 
designed with both objectives in mind. One 
Arizona began building its base in 2010, and 
as Table 1 further shows, in each subsequent 
year, the balance of the coalition’s ground 
game has focused on broadening that base.6 
For example, in 2015, 72.9 percent of the 
unique voters engaged by One Arizona’s 
ground game were voters not canvassed in 
previous door-to-door field programs. The 
remaining 27.1 percent of the unique voters 
engaged served to deepen relationships.
1.3   Voter Engagement by Type: Live 
Phone Banking
From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 972,134 
live phone calls,7 leading to 84,951 voter 
engagements with 66,654 unique voters. 
The bulk of these live phone-banking efforts 
occurred in the context of SB 1070. In 2010, 
One Arizona made 352,833 live phone calls, 
accounting for 36.3 percent of all of the 
live calls made during the period under 
evaluation. These calls resulted in 46,087 
successful voter engagements, accounting for 
54.3 percent of all voter engagements made 
via live phone banking during this period. 
Table 2 (next page) shows the evolution of 
One Arizona’s live phone banking efforts.
4. Contact rate equals voter contacts divided by outreach attempts.
5. This contrasts with the approach of having multiple conversations with the same voters over the course of an election 
cycle.
6. That is, the percentage of new unique voters engaged divided by unique voters engaged exceeds 50 percent.
7. Live phone calls excludes robocalls.
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1.3.1   Live Phone Banking Contact Rates 
As Table 2 shows, the average contact 
rate for One Arizona’s live phone banking 
efforts is 8.7 percent over the period. 
The rate reached a peak of 20.6 percent 
in 2011 but has generally decreased each 
year since 2010: For example, in 2014, out 
of 285,183 live phone calls made, 12,113, 
or 4.2 percent, resulted in a successful 
voter engagement. Contact rates for 
One Arizona’s live phone banking efforts 
resemble those of live phone banking 
efforts elsewhere (and phone-based 
survey research more generally), as caller 
ID—and, therefore, screening of unfamiliar 
numbers—have become ubiquitous, along 
with cell-phone usage. 
1.3.2  New Unique Voters Engaged via 
Live Phone Banking 
Despite its challenges, live phone banking 
has strongly complemented One Arizona’s 
ground game. Table 3 shows the number 
of new unique voters engaged by the 
coalition’s live phone banking efforts, 
distinguishing between voters who were 
called only and those who were called and 
walked via door-to-door canvassing efforts. 
As the table shows, live phone banking grew 
One Arizona’s base by 42,628 voters during 
the period under evaluation. 
Year Attempts Contacts
Contacts/
Attempts
2010 352,833 46,087 13.1%
2011 24,711 5,089 20.6%
2012 186,946 13,895 7.4%
2013 121,484 7,619 6.3%
2014 285,183 12,113 4.2%
2015 977 148 15.1%
Total 972,134 84,951 8.7%
Table 2.  2010-2015
Phone Banking Results
Year
Unique Voters 
Engaged: 
Called, Not 
Walked
Unique Voters 
Engaged: 
Called and 
Walked
2010 24,345 15,229
2011 1,350 1,834
2012 8,443 2,175
2013 2,130 2,915
2014 6,323 1,788
2015 37 85
Total 42,628 24,026
Table 3. Phone Banking: 
Unique Voters Engaged
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2. One Arizona Impact
What impact have One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts had? This section analyzes and reports 
the impact that One Arizona has had on voter turnout focusing on the elections listed in Table 4.
Even-Year 
Federal 
Elections Date Type
Bias-Adjusted 
Treatment 
Effect
Bias-Adjusted 
Treatment 
Effect: Latinos
2010 November 2 General 10.1% 19.9%
2012 November 6 General 13.6% 19.6%
2014 November 4 General 6.1% 13.2%
Odd-Year 
Municipal 
Elections
2011 August 30 Phoenix Municipal 
Primary
0.5% to 0.6% 6.4% to 6.6%
2011 November 8 Phoenix Municipal 
General
-1.2% to -0.8% 4.9% to 6.3%
2013 August 27 Phoenix Municipal 
Primary
8.5% 12.1%
2013 November 5 Phoenix Municipal 
General
Ns 6.5%
2015 August 25 Phoenix Municipal 
Primary
11.1% 17.1%
Table 4.  2010-2015 Voter Engagement and Turnout Results
Ns = not statistically significant. Note: The treatment effect for even-year elections focuses on low-propensity voters. The 
range for the 2011 municipal elections reflects the results when including robocalls, and when excluding robocalls. 2011 was 
the only year in which One Arizona relied heavily on robocalls.
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2.1   2010 General Election
• One Arizona made over 1 million 
attempted contacts to just under 300,000 
unique voters during the 2010 general 
election. These efforts were concentrated 
in Maricopa County, Pima County, and 
Yuma County. 
• Just over three out of every four voters 
targeted were low-propensity voters. 
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts    
were distributed primarily across      
door-to-door canvassing, live phone 
banking, and mailers.  
• During the 2010 general election, One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout among low-propensity 
voters by a robust 10.1 percent (p < .000).
• Focusing on Hispanics/Latinos, the 
data indicate that One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts increased turnout 
among low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters by a robust 19.9 percent (p < .000).
During the 2010 general election, One Arizona 
made 1,159,018 attempted contacts to 298,981 
unique voters. 86.8 percent of these unique 
voters were in Maricopa County, Pima County, 
and Yuma County.8 77.8 percent of the unique 
voters targeted by One Arizona during the 2010 
general election were low-propensity voters and 
22.2 percent were high-propensity voters.2 83.7 
percent were Hispanic/Latino and 12.2 percent 
were Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing, live 
phone banking, and mailers accounted for 
nearly all of One Arizona’s attempted outreach. 
Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 24.1 
percent of attempted contacts, live phone 
banking accounted for 30.4 percent of attempted 
contacts, and mailers accounted for 38.4 
percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-
door canvassing rate was 38.8 percent. The live 
phone banking contact rate was 25.1 percent.
The following thus analyzes the efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2010 general election focusing Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County (n = 
208,929). All voters are analyzed first, and then 
Hispanics/Latinos are analyzed separately.
One way to evaluate efficacy is to ask whether 
the voters One Arizona attempted to contact 
and successfully engaged were more likely to 
vote than the voters One Arizona attempted 
to contact but did not engage. 45.8 percent of 
the voters One Arizona successfully engaged 
voted, whereas 35.0 percent of the voters that 
One Arizona attempted to contact but did not 
engage voted. This difference in turnout of 10.8 
percent is highly statistically significant (p < .000). 
This basic comparison, however, begs important 
questions. One set of questions relates to the 
voting behavior of the voters who were and were 
not part of One Arizona’s voter engagement 
efforts. More specifically, at what rate did voters 
who were not targeted by One Arizona vote, 
and how does this compare to the voters One 
Arizona targeted? Table 5 addresses this question 
below by disaggregating voters based on vote 
propensity. Another set of questions relates to 
whether the voters One Arizona successfully 
engaged were already more likely to vote than 
the voters One Arizona did not engage and, if 
so, how to adjust for this bias when evaluating 
efficacy. This is addressed in Table 6.
8. Based on 240,856 voters for which data are available. Such slippage is common. More specifically, as the amount of time 
increases between when a field program happens and when data are requested from a data vendor—be it from VAN 
(which One Arizona uses) or even a County Registrar of Voters—voter files inevitably change as people move, die, etc.
9. Based on 240,864 voters for which vote history data is available.
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Table 5 disaggregates voters by detailed vote 
propensity. For the 2010 general election, “4 of 4” 
refers to voters who were eligible to vote in the 
2002 general election and voted in each of the 
2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 general elections. 
“3 of 3” refers to voters who registered to vote 
after the 2002 general election, but before the 
2004 general election and voted in each of the 
2004, 2006, and 2008 general elections. This 
pattern repeats down to “0 of 0,” which refers to 
individuals who registered to vote after the 2008 
general election but before the 2010 general 
election (i.e., newly registered voters). These 
categories are mutually exclusive, meaning a 
voter can only be in one category, which avoids 
double counting. Table 5 further distinguishes 
between three types of voters: voters One Arizona 
attempted to contact and successfully engaged 
(column a), voters One Arizona attempted to 
contact but did not engage (column b), and 
voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and 
Yuma County who were not part of One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts (column c).  
As the table shows, the voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged during the 2010 general 
election were statistically significantly more likely 
to vote than the voters One Arizona attempted 
to contact but did not engage (see column d). 
This holds true across the entire range of vote 
propensities. The table also shows that the low-
propensity voters One Arizona successfully 
engaged were significantly more likely to vote 
than the low-propensity voters in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County who 
were outside of One Arizona’s target universe 
(see column e). However, the same is not true at 
the higher vote propensities.
Vote Propensity
a
Engaged
b
Not 
Engaged
c
Not Targeted
d
a minus b
e
a minus c
4 of 4 90.3% 82.1% 91.2% 8.2%*** -0.9%*
3 of 4 70.4% 61.5% 71.9% 8.9%*** -1.5%***
2 of 4 51.2% 39.2% 47.3% 12.0%*** 3.9%***
1 of 4 40.5% 19.9% 28.6% 20.6%*** 11.9%***
0 of 4 21.7% 4.9% 10.1% 16.8% 11.6%
3 of 3 76.5% 61.6% 75.8% 14.9%*** Ns
2 of 3 46.1% 37.9% 43.9% 8.2%*** 2.2%***
1 of 3 36.5% 15.6% 21.7% 20.9%*** 14.8%***
0 of 3 19.5% 5.9% 7.9% 13.6%*** 11.6%***
2 of 2 76.4% 64.5% 75.1% 11.9%*** Ns
1 of 2 43.9% 32.2% 40.1% 11.7%*** 3.8%***
0 of 2 25.2% 7.8% 9.4% 17.4%*** 15.8%***
1 of 1 52.4% 38.1% 47.8% 14.3%*** 4.6%***
0 of 1 25.7% 11.2% 12.3% 14.5%*** 13.4%***
0 of 0 31.2% 18.5% 36.6% 12.7%*** -5.4%***
Table 5.  2010 General Election: Voter Categories
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns 
= not significant.
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Table 6 shows the overall efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2010 general election distinguishing 
between low- and high-propensity voters. 
Turnout among the low-propensity voters 
One Arizona successfully engaged was 
41.4 percent. In contrast, turnout among 
the low-propensity voters in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County 
who One Arizona did not engage was 32.2 
percent. This difference of 9.2 percent is 
highly statistically significant (p < .000). This 
measure is analogous to what is referred 
to as an “intent-to-treat effect.” More 
specifically, by focusing only on those voters 
who One Arizona successfully engaged, 
this measure of efficacy does not take into 
account the potential bias that those who 
One Arizona engaged during a political 
season were already more likely to vote. It 
is thus important to ask whether the voters 
One Arizona successfully engaged are a 
biased sub-group of voters. Ideally, voter 
engagement efforts would be designed like 
randomized control trials (RCTs). Voters10 
would be randomly assigned to control and 
treatment groups. The control group would 
receive no attempted intervention by One 
Arizona (or a placebo message) and the 
treatment group(s) would represent the 
voters One Arizona attempted to contact. 
Random assignment would distribute voters 
of different demographic characteristics 
(e.g., age, sex, race and ethnicity, etc.), 
voting histories, and other important 
factors, similarly across the groups, which 
addresses initial concerns about bias.11 
From here, the question of whether the 
individuals successfully engaged by One 
Arizona are a biased sub-group of voters 
could be accounted for in multiple ways. 
Taking these steps leads to a final measure 
of efficacy—a bias-adjusted treatment 
effect—that accounts for known sources of 
bias. However, in the absence of an RCT, 
arriving at a bias-adjusted treatment effect 
is more difficult. 
Table 6 thus reports three different 
measures of efficacy. The intent-to-treat 
effect compares turnout among voters One 
Arizona successfully engaged and turnout 
among voters who were not engaged. This 
measure does not account for the fact that 
some of the voters One Arizona attempted 
to contact were not engaged. It also does 
not account for the possibility that the 
voters One Arizona engaged were already 
more likely to vote. However, it is included 
because it is perhaps the most intuitive 
measure of efficacy. The second measure, 
the instrumental variable method, uses 
contact rates to adjust for bias. We include it 
here because it is a familiar and commonly 
used measure in voter engagement RCTs.12 
However, it is not likely to effectively adjust 
for bias for our purposes here given One 
Arizona did not determine who to attempt to 
contact and who not to attempt to contact 
using a random assignment procedure.13 
The third measure, which is the most 
desirable, uses a statistical method referred 
10. Random assignment can also be performed at the household level, the precinct level, and other units.
11. Balance tests would then confirm that control and treatment group(s) did not substantively differ.
12. For example, see Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on 
Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review 94, no. 03 (2000): 653–63.
13. This is a commonly used measure to evaluate the treatment effect of canvassing in a RCT. More specifically, an instrumental 
variable regression is used to estimate the effect of voter engagement on turnout. This method adjusts for bias in two 
steps. The first step is to model the likelihood of successfully engaging a voter using random assignment as an independent 
variable. The intuition here is that random assignment is related to whether a voter contact is attempted, but is not related to 
whether a voter votes. The results of the first stage analysis are then used to create a new variable—one that still reflects whether 
a voter is engaged, but is weighed differently based on contact rates—that is used to estimate a bias-adjusted treatment effect.
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to as inverse probability weighting. This 
method is designed for non-randomized 
observational studies, which is the category 
of research that the work of One Arizona 
falls under. This measure reweighs the voters 
One Arizona successfully engaged to reflect 
the characteristics of the voters One Arizona 
did not attempt to contact—this ensures that 
the voters One Arizona successfully engaged 
are not a “stacked deck.”14 For example, if 
35-year-old Hispanics/Latinos with strong 
voting histories are significantly more likely 
to vote than other Hispanics/Latinos, and 
such voters are overrepresented in the 
pool of voters successfully engaged by 
One Arizona, the use of inverse probability 
weighting weighs these voters down in the 
analysis. Another strength of this approach 
is that we can “feed” the model multiple 
characteristics simultaneously. The analysis 
below uses attempted contact, age, sex, 
marital status, and year of registration to 
adjust for potential bias.15   
For low-propensity voters in Maricopa County 
and Pima County, the intent-to-treat effect 
is 9.2 percent with a low of 8.9 percent and 
a high of 9.5 percent. The result obtained 
from the instrumental variable method is 
a more modest 5.6 percent with a low of 
5.3 percent and a high of 5.9 percent. The 
result obtained from the inverse probability 
weighting method is a robust 10.1 percent 
with a low of 9.8 percent and a high of 10.4 
percent. That the result obtained from the 
inverse probability method is stronger than 
the intent-to-treat effect suggests that 
One Arizona effectively engaged difficult to 
mobilize parts of the electorate. These results 
are all highly statistically significant (p < .000). 
For high-propensity voters in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County, 
the results are consistently negative across 
estimation methods.16
Altogether, these results make clear the strong 
impact that One Arizona’s voter engagement 
efforts during the 2010 general election 
had on low-propensity voters. Whereas 31.3 
percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County voted 
during the 2010 general election, 41.4 percent 
of the low-propensity voters that One Arizona 
successfully engaged voted.17
Low- 
Propensity 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
9.2% <.000 8.9%, 9.5%
Instrumental 
variable
5.6% <.000 5.3%, 5.9%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
10.1% <.000 9.8%, 10.4%
Table 6.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
14. This proceeds in two steps. The first stage is to model the likelihood of contact by as many characteristics that we can feed 
the model. To illustrate, if we suspected that One Arizona was “stacking the deck” by engaging higher-propensity voters, 
the first-stage model would include vote propensity as a factor.
15. These are the variables that factor into One Arizona’s “Latino plus” targeting. Vote history and race and ethnicity are 
blocked, and thus also accounted for.
16. For example, the intent-to-treat effect is -14.3 percent (p < .000).
17. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County, 
Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election. 
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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The evaluation of treatment effects provides 
an additional metric by which to evaluate 
efficacy: additional voters added to the 
electorate. For example, in an electorate 
of 10,000 voters, if 5,000 were assigned 
to a control group, meaning they were 
not engaged, and 50 percent voted, this 
means that 2,500 voters would have voted 
without an intervention. If the remaining 
5,000 voters were assigned to a treatment 
group, meaning they were targeted by One 
Arizona, and 60 percent voted, this means 
that 3,000 voters would have voted after 
being engaged (assuming a perfect contact 
rate). Altogether, the 10 percent treatment 
effect in this example translates into 500 
additional voters added to the electorate.18 
During the 2010 general election, One 
Arizona added an impressive 12,925 low-
propensity voters to the electorate. 
Table 7 repeats the analysis, but focuses 
on Hispanics/Latinos. For low-propensity 
Hispanics/Latinos, the intent-to-treat effect 
is 21.6 percent with a low of 21.2 percent and 
a high of 21.9 percent. The result obtained 
from the instrumental variable method is 
22.0 percent with a low of 21.6 percent and 
a high of 22.4 percent. The result obtained 
from the inverse probability weighting 
method is 19.9 percent with a low of 19.5 
percent and a high of 20.3 percent. These 
results are all highly statistically significant 
(p < .000). However, similar to the analysis 
of all high-propensity voters, the results 
are consistently negative across estimation 
methods when focusing on high-propensity 
Hispanics/Latinos.
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2010 general election increased turnout 
among low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos by 
19.9 percent. Whereas 21.2 percent of low-
propensity Hispanics/Latinos in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County 
voted during the 2010 general election, 41.1 
percent of the low-propensity Hispanics/
Latinos who One Arizona successfully 
engaged voted.19
18. It is important to note that the potential to add voters to the electorate is greatest at the low-propensity strata. For 
example, as high-propensity voters, especially during presidential election years, tend to vote at rates near or above 90 
percent in many locales, there is a narrower ceiling when it comes to the potential size of treatment effects. Otherwise put, 
there is more room between 50 percent and 100 percent than there is between 90 percent and 100 percent. Moreover, 
low-propensity voters tend to outnumber high-propensity voters in many locales across the country.
19. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election.
Low- 
Propensity 
Hispanic/
Latino 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
21.6% <.000 21.2%, 21.9%
Instrumental 
variable
22.0% <.000 21.6%, 22.4%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
19.9% <.000 19.5%, 20.3%
Table 7.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy:  Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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2.2   2011 Municipal Primary Election    
in Phoenix
• One Arizona made nearly 200,000 
attempted contacts to just under 40,000 
unique voters during the 2011 municipal 
primary election in Phoenix. 
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts 
were distributed across door-to-door 
canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, 
and robocalls.  
• One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2011 municipal primary election 
in Phoenix increased turnout among all 
targeted voters by 0.5 percent and 0.6 
percent, but the results are inconsistently 
positive and statistically significant.
• However, when focusing on Hispanic/
Latino voters, the data indicate that 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout among targeted 
Hispanic/Latino voters by up to 6.6 
percent (p < .000).
The following analyzes the efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 
2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix (n = 
41,969).20 In Phoenix, One Arizona made 191,038 
attempted contacts to 41,969 unique voters. 
83.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino.21 Attempted 
contacts were spread across door-to-door 
canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and 
other modes of contact (mainly robocalls). Door-
to-door canvassing accounted for 20.6 percent 
of attempted contacts, live phone banking 
accounted for 10.5 percent of attempted contacts,
mailers accounted for 21.9 percent of attempted 
contacts, and other modes accounted for 46.9 
percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 44.2 percent. The live 
phone banking contact rate was 40.6 percent.
Table 8 shows the efficacy of One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts during the 2011 
municipal primary election in Phoenix. The 
first set of results includes all engagements, 
including robocalls. The intent-to-treat effect 
is -0.4 percent with a range of 0.0 percent to 
-0.8 percent. The result obtained from the 
instrumental variable method is -3.7 percent 
with range of -3.2 percent to -4.2 percent. The 
result obtained from the inverse probability 
method is 0.5 percent with a low of 0.1 percent 
and a high of 0.9 percent. The table also re-runs 
the analysis when excluding robocalls. When 
excluding robocalls, the intent-to-treat effect 
is statistically insignificant. The result obtained 
from the instrumental variable method is -1.7 
percent with a range of -1.2 percent to -2.1 
percent. The result obtained from the inverse 
probability method is 0.6 percent with a low of 
0.1 percent and a high of 0.9 percent.
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 
2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix had 
a modest effect of between 0.5 percent (when 
including robocalls) and 0.6 percent (when 
excluding robocalls). Whereas this analysis includes 
all voters, the results are drastically different when 
focusing only on Hispanic/Latino voters.
20. I note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2011 municipal primary elections. Outside of Phoenix, 
One Arizona made 166,082 attempted contacts to 36,318 unique voters. Whereas 33.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino, 61.0 
percent are currently coded in the VAN as “unknown.” This is based on 25,416 voters for which data are available Attempted 
contacts during the 2011 municipal primary elections outside of Phoenix were also spread across door-to-door canvassing, live 
phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (again, mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 21.6 percent 
of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 21.3 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 18.4 percent 
of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 38.8 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing 
contact rate outside of Phoenix was 62.8 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 82.9 percent.
21. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 41,969 voters.
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Table 9 repeats the analysis, but focuses 
on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/
Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 5.6 
percent with a low of 5.4 percent and a high 
of 5.7 percent. The result obtained from 
the instrumental variable method is 6.3 
percent with a low of 5.9 percent and a high 
of 6.7 percent. The result obtained from 
the inverse probability weighting method 
is 6.6 percent with a low of 6.2 percent and 
a high of 7.0 percent. These results are all 
highly statistically significant (p < .000). 
When excluding robocalls, the intent-to-
treat effect for Hispanic/Latino voters is 6.9 
percent with a low of 6.7 percent and a high 
of 7.3 percent. The result obtained from 
the instrumental variable method is 6.4 
percent with a low of 6.1 percent and a high 
of 6.7 percent. The result obtained from the 
inverse probability weighting method is 6.4 
percent with a low of 6.0 percent and a high 
of 6.9 percent. These results are all highly 
statistically significant (p < .000). 
Altogether, combined with the results 
above, the data indicate that the impact of 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2011 municipal primary election 
in Phoenix were concentrated with Hispanic/
Latino voters. One Arizona increased 
turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino 
voters by between 6.6 percent (when 
including robocalls) and 6.4 percent (when 
excluding robocalls).22
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
All modes 
of contact
Intent-to- 
treat effect
-0.4% .023 0.0%, -0.8%
Instrumental 
variable
-3.7% <.000 -3.2%, -4.2%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
0.5% <.000 0.1%, 0.9%
Excluding 
robocalls
Intent-to- 
treat effect
-0.3% .149 -0.7%, 0.1%
Instrumental 
variable
-1.7% <.000 -1.2%, -2.1%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
0.6% <.000 0.1%, -0.9%
Table 8.  2011 Municipal 
Primary: Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
22. Whereas it is reasonable to expect the effect to be lower when including robocalls, the results suggest that One Arizona 
used robocalls to “blanket” difficult to mobilize voters who had not been the targets of previous voter engagement efforts 
and/or were low-propensity voters. We note here that municipal election vote history was not available for the purposes of 
the analysis.
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2.3   2011 Municipal General Election    
in Phoenix
• One Arizona made over 100,000 
attempted contacts to just over 30,000 
unique voters during the 2011 municipal 
general election in Phoenix. 
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts 
were distributed across door-to-door 
canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, 
and robocalls.  
• The data indicates that One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts during the 2011 
municipal general election in Phoenix 
did not increase turnout among targeted 
voters when all voters are analyzed. 
• However, when focusing on Hispanic/
Latino voters, the data indicates that 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout among targeted 
Hispanic/Latino voters by up to 6.3 
percent (p < .000).
The following analyzes the efficacy of 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2011 municipal general election 
in Phoenix (n = 32,144).23 In Phoenix, One 
Arizona made 117,873 attempted contacts 
to 32,144 unique voters. 89.1 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino. 24 Attempted contacts were 
spread across door-to-door canvassing, 
live phone banking, mailers, and other 
modes of contact (mainly robocalls). 
Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 
19.4 percent of attempted contacts, live 
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Hispanic/
Latino: all 
modes of 
contact
Intent-to- 
treat effect
5.6% <.000 5.4%, 5.7%
Instrumental 
variable
6.3% <.000 5.9%, 6.7%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
6.6% <.000 6.2%, 7.0%
Hispanic/
Latino: 
Excluding 
robocalls
Intent-to- 
treat effect
6.9% <.000 6.2%, 7.0%
Instrumental 
variable
-1.7% <.000 6.1%, 6.7%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
0.6% <.000 6.0%, 6.9%
Table 9.  2011 Municipal 
Primary Voter Engagement 
Efficacy: Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
23. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2011 municipal general elections. Outside 
of Phoenix, One Arizona made 69,939 attempted contacts to 36,238 unique voters. 88.3 percent were Hispanic/Latino. 
This is based on 11,494 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2011 municipal general elections 
outside of Phoenix were spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact 
(again, mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 20.7 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking 
accounted for 31.1 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 19.9 percent of attempted contacts, and other 
modes accounted for 28.3 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix 
was 34.5 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 93.7 percent.
24. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 32,144 voters.
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phone banking accounted for 5.1 percent 
of attempted contacts, mailers accounted 
for 30.8 percent of attempted contacts, and 
other modes accounted for 44.7 percent 
of attempted contacts. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 33.9 percent. 
The live phone banking contact rate was 
36.9 percent.
Table 10 shows the efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2011 municipal general election in 
Phoenix. The first set of results includes all 
engagements, including robocalls. As the 
table shows, the results are consistently 
negative across each of the estimation 
methods. This remains true when re-
running the analysis when excluding 
robocalls. These results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2011 municipal general election in 
Phoenix did not increase turnout among 
targeted voters when all voters are 
analyzed. However, similar to the pattern 
for the 2011 municipal primary election 
in Phoenix, the results are drastically 
different when focusing only on Hispanic/
Latino voters.
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
All modes 
of contact
Intent-to- 
treat effect
-0.8% <.000 -0.4%, -1.2%
Instrumental 
variable
-0.9% <.000 -0.4%, -1.4%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
-1.2% <.000 -0.8%, -1.6%
Excluding 
robocalls
Intent-to- 
treat effect
-0.8% <.000 -0.4%, -1.2%
Instrumental 
variable
-1.8% <.000 -1.3%, -2.3%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
-0.8% <.000 -0.4%, -1.2%
Table 10.  2011 Municipal 
General Election: Voter 
Engagement Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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Table 11 repeats the analysis but focuses 
on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/
Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 
6.9 percent with a low of 6.6 percent and 
a high of 7.3 percent. The result obtained 
from the instrumental variable method is 
7.5 percent with a low of 7.2 percent and 
a high of 7.9 percent. The result obtained 
from the inverse probability weighting 
method is 4.9 percent with a low of 4.5 
percent and a high of 5.4 percent. These 
results are all highly statistically significant 
(p < .000). When excluding robocalls, 
the intent-to-treat effect for Hispanic/
Latino voters is 6.9 percent with a low of 
6.8 percent and a high of 7.1 percent. The 
result obtained from the instrumental 
variable method is 5.8 percent with a low 
of 5.4 percent and a high of 6.1 percent. 
The result obtained from the inverse 
probability weighting method is 6.3 
percent with a low of 5.8 percent and a 
high of 6.8 percent. These results are all 
highly statistically significant (p < .000).
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2011 municipal general election in 
Phoenix increased turnout among targeted 
Hispanic/Latino voters by between 4.9 
percent (when including robocalls) and 6.3 
percent (when excluding robocalls).
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Hispanic/
Latino: all 
modes of 
contact
Intent-to- 
treat effect
6.9% <.000 6.6%, 7.3%
Instrumental 
variable
7.5% <.000 7.2%, 7.9%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
4.9% <.000 4.5%, 5.4%
Hispanic/
Latino: 
Excluding 
robocalls
Intent-to- 
treat effect
6.9% <.000 6.2%, 7.0%
Instrumental 
variable
5.8% <.000 5.4%, 6.1%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
6.3% <.000 5.8%, 6.8%
Table 11.  2011 Municipal 
General Election Voter 
Engagement Efficacy: Latino 
Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
ONE ARIZONA Evaluation Report | June 2016    69 
2.4  2012 General Election
• One Arizona made over 350,000 
attempted contacts to over 200,000 
unique voters during the 2012 general 
election. These efforts were concentrated 
in Maricopa County and Pima County.
• Just over two-thirds of voters targeted 
were low-propensity voters. 
• Door-to-door canvassing and live phone 
banking accounted for nearly all of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2012 general election. 
• The data indicate that One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts increased 
turnout among low-propensity voters by 
13.6 percent (p < .000).
• For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters, the data indicate that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout by a robust 19.6 
percent (p < .000).
During the 2012 general election, One 
Arizona made 366,090 attempted contacts 
to 205,828 unique voters. 88.9 percent 
of these unique voters were in Maricopa 
County and Pima County.25   67.6 percent of 
the unique voters targeted by One Arizona 
during the 2012 general election were low-
propensity voters and 22.4 percent were 
high-propensity voters.26 81.5 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino and 15.3 percent were 
Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing and 
live phone banking accounted for nearly 
all of One Arizona’s attempted outreach. 
Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 
47.9 percent of attempted contacts and live 
phone banking accounted for 51.0 percent 
of attempted contacts. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 22.2 percent. 
The live phone banking contact rate was 
8.3 percent.
The following thus analyzes the efficacy 
of One Arizona’s voter engagement 
efforts during the 2012 general election 
focusing Maricopa County and Pima 
County (n = 132,634). All voters are 
analyzed first, and then Hispanic/Latino 
voters are analyzed separately.
Table 12 disaggregates voters by detailed 
vote propensity.27 As the table shows, the 
voters One Arizona successfully engaged 
during the 2012 general election were 
statistically significantly more likely to vote 
than the voters One Arizona attempted to 
contact but did not engage (see column 
d). This holds true across the entire range 
of vote propensities. The table also shows 
that the low-propensity voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged were significantly 
more likely to vote than the low-propensity 
voters in Maricopa County and Pima County 
who were outside of One Arizona’s target 
universe (see column e). 
25. Based on 322,657 voters for which data are available. 
26. Based on 315,625 voters for which data area available.
27. For the 2012 general election, “4 of 4” refers to voters who were eligible to vote in the 2004 general election and voted in 
each of the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 general elections. “3 of 3” refers to voters who registered to vote after the 2004 
general election, but before the 2006 general election and voted in each of the 2006, 2008, and 2010 general elections. 
This pattern repeats down to “0 of 0,” which refers to individuals who registered to vote after the 2010 general election, 
but before the 2012 general election.
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Vote Propensity
a
Engaged
b
Not 
Engaged
c
Not Targeted
d
a minus b
e
a minus c
4 of 4 96.7% 94.9% 96.2% 1.8%*** Ns
3 of 4 86.9% 80.1% 82.9% 6.8%*** 4.0%***
2 of 4 76.7% 68.6% 66.5% 8.1%*** 10.2%***
1 of 4 58.6% 48.7% 45.3% 9.9%*** 13.3%***
0 of 4 30.4% 17.2% 17.6% 13.2%*** 12.8%***
3 of 3 93.5% 89.6% 93.1% 3.9%* Ns
2 of 3 84.9% 76.7% 76.4% 8.2%*** 8.5%***
1 of 3 71.1% 54.7% 54.4% 16.6%*** 16.7%***
0 of 3 34.4% 24.8% 22.2% 9.6%*** 12.2%***
2 of 2 90.9% 86.1% 88.2% 4.8%*** 2.7%***
1 of 2 70.0% 58.6% 55.9% 11.4%*** 14.1%***
0 of 2 40.9% 27.1% 23.5% 13.8%*** 17.4%***
1 of 1 84.3% 76.4% 83.5% 7.9%*** Ns
0 of 1 49.8% 34.6% 35.7% 14.5%*** 14.1%***
0 of 0 66.5% 51.2% 56.6% 15.2%*** 9.9%***
Table 12.  2012 General Election: Voter Categories
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns 
= not significant.
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Table 13 shows the overall efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2012 general election distinguishing 
between low- and high-propensity voters. 
For low-propensity voters, the intent-to-
treat effect is 14.1 percent with a low of 
13.3 percent and a high of 14.8 percent. 
The result obtained from the instrumental 
variable method is 10.9 percent with a 
range of 9.2 percent to 12.6 percent. The 
result obtained from the inverse probability 
weighting method, which to recall adjusts 
for bias using attempted contact, age, sex, 
marital status, and year of registration, is 
13.6 percent with a low of 12.9 percent and 
a high of 14.3 percent. These results are all 
highly statistically significant (p < .000). For 
high-propensity voters in Maricopa County 
and Pima County, the results are consistently 
negative across estimation methods.
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2012 general election increased turnout 
among low-propensity voters by a robust 
13.6 percent. Whereas 48.4 percent of low-
propensity voters in Maricopa County and 
Pima County voted during the 2012 general 
election, 62.0 percent of the low-propensity 
voters that One Arizona successfully 
engaged voted.28 During the 2012 general 
election, One Arizona added 2,457 low-
propensity voters to the electorate.
Table 14 repeats the analysis, but focuses on 
Hispanic/Latino voters. For low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat 
effect is 20.6 percent with a low of 19.8 
percent and a high of 21.4 percent. The 
result obtained from the instrumental 
variable method is 49.1 percent with a low 
of 47.4 percent and a high of 50.8 percent. 
Recall that the instrumental variable method 
is most likely an inappropriate measure of 
efficacy for our purposes here given One 
Arizona did not use a random assignment 
procedure to determine which voters to 
include and exclude from their target 
universe. The result obtained from the 
inverse probability weighting method is 19.6 
percent with a low of 18.9 percent and a high 
of 20.4 percent. These results are all highly 
statistically significant (p < .000). Similar to 
the analysis of all high-propensity voters, 
the results are consistently negative across 
estimation methods when focusing on high-
propensity Hispanic/Latino voters.
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2012 general election increased turnout 
among low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters by a robust 19.6 percent. Whereas 41.5 
percent of low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters in Maricopa County and Pima County 
voted during the 2012 general election, 61.1 
percent of the low-propensity Hispanic/
Latino voters who One Arizona successfully 
engaged voted.29
28. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election. 
29. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.
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Low- 
Propensity 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
14.1% <.000 13.3%, 14.8%
Instrumental 
variable
10.9% <.000 9.2%, 12.6%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
13.6% <.000 12.9%, 14.3%
Table 13.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
Low- 
Propensity 
Hispanic/
Latino 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
20.6% <.000 19.8%, 21.4%
Instrumental 
variable
49.1% <.000 47.4%, 50.8%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
19.6% <.000 18.9%, 20.4%
Table 14.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy:  Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
2.5   2013 Municipal Primary Election    
in Phoenix
• One Arizona made nearly 130,000 
attempted contacts to over 33,000 
unique voters during the 2013 municipal 
primary election in Phoenix.  
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts 
focused on door-to-door canvassing and 
live phone banking.  
• One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2013 municipal primary 
election in Phoenix increased turnout 
among all targeted voters by 8.5 percent 
(p < .000).
• Focusing on Hispanics/Latinos, the 
data indicate that One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts increased turnout by 
12.1 percent ( p < .000).
The following analyzes the efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2013 municipal primary election in 
Phoenix (n = 33,456).30 In Phoenix, One Arizona 
made 129,554 attempted contacts to 33,456 
unique voters. 92.4 percent were Hispanic/
Latino.31 Attempted contacts focused on door-
to-door canvassing and live phone banking. 
Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 42.9 
percent of attempted contacts and live phone 
banking accounted for 57.1 percent of attempted 
contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact 
rate was 31.3 percent. The live phone banking 
contact rate was 19.4 percent.
30. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2013 municipal primary elections. Outside of 
Phoenix, One Arizona made 18,311 attempted contacts to 7,266 unique voters. 83.0 percent were Hispanic/Latino. This is 
based on 3,473 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2013 municipal primary elections outside 
of Phoenix also focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 36.6 
percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 63.4 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door 
canvassing rate outside of Phoenix was 15.1 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 13.9 percent. 
31. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,456 voters.
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Table 15 shows the efficacy of One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts during the 2013 
municipal primary election in Phoenix. The 
intent-to-treat effect is 10.2 percent with a low 
of 9.7 percent and a high of 10.7 percent. The 
result obtained from the instrumental variable 
method is 10.6 percent with a low of 9.8 percent 
and a high of 11.5 percent. The result obtained 
from the inverse probability method is 8.5 
percent with a low of 7.9 percent and a high of 
9.2 percent. 
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 
2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix 
increased turnout among targeted voters by 
8.5 percent.
Table 16 repeats the analysis but focuses 
on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/
Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 14.1 
percent with a low of 13.8 percent and a high 
of 14.5 percent. The result obtained from the 
instrumental variable method is 20.1 percent 
with a low of 19.5 percent and a high of 20.6 
percent. The result obtained from the inverse 
probability weighting method is 12.1 percent 
with a low of 11.5 percent and a high of 12.8 
percent. These results are all highly statistically 
significant (p < .000). 
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 
2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix 
increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/
Latino voters by 12.1 percent.
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
10.2% <.000 9.2%, 10.7%
Instrumental 
variable
10.6% <.000 9.8%, 11.5%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
8.5% <.000 7.9%, 9.2%
Table 15.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
Low- 
Propensity 
Hispanic/
Latino 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
14.1% <.000 13.8%, 14.5%
Instrumental 
variable
20.1% <.000 19.5%, 20.6%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
12.1% <.000 11.5%, 12.8%
Table 16.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy:  Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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2.6   2013 Municipal General Election    
in Phoenix
• One Arizona made nearly 75,000 
attempted contacts to nearly 34,000 
unique voters during the 2013 municipal 
general election in Phoenix. 
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts 
focused on door-to-door canvassing and 
live phone banking.  
• The data indicate that One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts during the 
2013 municipal general election in 
Phoenix did not increase turnout among 
targeted voters when all voters are 
analyzed. 
• However, when focusing on Hispanic/Latino 
voters, the data indicate that One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts increased 
turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino 
voters by 6.5 percent (p < .000).
The following analyzes the efficacy of 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2013 municipal general election 
in Phoenix (n = 33,864).32 In Phoenix, One 
Arizona made 73,369 attempted contacts 
to 33,864 unique voters. 89.8 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino.33 Attempted contacts focused 
on door-to-door canvassing and live phone 
banking. Door-to-door canvassing accounted 
for 58.8 percent of attempted contacts and 
live phone banking accounted for 41.2 percent 
of attempted contacts. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 37.4 percent. The live 
phone banking contact rate was 11.7 percent.
Table 17 shows the efficacy of One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts during the 2013 
municipal general election in Phoenix. The 
intent-to-treat effect is positive (0.4 percent) but 
statistically insignificant. The results obtained 
from the instrumental variable and inverse 
probability methods are consistently negative.
These results suggest that One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal 
general election in Phoenix did not increase 
turnout among targeted voters when all voters 
are analyzed.
32. We note here that One Arizona also ran a modest program outside of Phoenix during the 2013 municipal general 
elections. Outside of Phoenix, One Arizona made 12,338 attempted contacts to 6,643 unique voters. 82.1 percent 
were Hispanic/Latino. This is based on 2,898 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2013 
municipal general elections outside of Phoenix also focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking. 
Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 53.1 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 46.9 
percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix was 24.1 percent. The live 
phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 8.6 percent.
33. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,864 voters.
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
0.4% .196 -1.1%, 0.2%
Instrumental 
variable
-10.9% <.000 -9.6%, -12.2%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
-0.7% .024 -0.1%, -1.3%
Table 17.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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Table 18 repeats the analysis, but focuses 
on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/
Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 7.9 
percent with a low of 7.5 percent and a high 
of 8.4 percent. The result obtained from the 
instrumental variable method is 14.4 percent 
with a low of 13.5 percent and a high of 
15.3 percent. The result obtained from the 
inverse probability weighting method is 6.5 
percent with a low of 5.9 percent and a high 
of 7.1 percent. These results are all highly 
statistically significant (p < .000). 
Altogether, combined with the results 
above, the data indicate that the impact of 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2013 municipal primary election 
in Phoenix were concentrated with Hispanic/
Latino voters. One Arizona increased turnout 
among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by 
6.5 percent.
2.7   2014 General Election
• One Arizona made over a half million 
attempted contacts to nearly one-
quarter of a million unique voters during 
the 2014 general election. These efforts 
were concentrated in Maricopa County 
and Pima County. 
• Just over 60 percent of targeted voters 
were low-propensity voters. 
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts were 
distributed across door-to-door canvassing, 
live phone banking, and mailers. 
• During the 2014 general election, One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout among low-propensity 
voters by 6.1 percent (p < .000).
• For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters, the data indicate that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
increased turnout by a robust 13.2 
percent  (p < .000).
During the 2014 general election, One 
Arizona made 551,270 attempted contacts to 
231,565 unique voters. 97.8 percent of these 
unique voters were in Maricopa County and 
Pima County.34 62.1 percent of the unique 
voters targeted by One Arizona during the 
2014 general election were low-propensity 
voters and 37.9 percent were high-propensity 
voters. 35 74.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino 
and 17.7 percent were Caucasian. Door-to-
door canvassing accounted for 28.1 percent 
of attempted contacts, live phone banking 
accounted for 51.7 percent of attempted 
contacts, and mailers accounted for 20.2 percent 
of attempted contacts. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 14.9 percent. The live 
phone banking contact rate was 8.3 percent. 
Low- 
Propensity 
Hispanic/
Latino 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
7.9% <.000 7.5%, 8.4%
Instrumental 
variable
14.4% <.000 13.5%, 15.3%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
6.5% <.000 5.9%, 7.1%
Table 18.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy:  Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
34. Based on 215,527  voters for which data are available. 
35. Based on 215,534 voters for which data area available.
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The following thus analyzes the efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2014 general election focusing Maricopa 
County and Pima County (n = 210,755). All 
voters are analyzed first, and then Hispanic/
Latino voters are analyzed separately. 
Table 19 disaggregates voters by detailed vote 
propensity.36 As the table shows, the voters 
One Arizona successfully engaged during 
the 2014 general election were statistically 
significantly more likely to vote than the voters 
One Arizona attempted to contact but did not 
engage (see column d). This holds true across 
nearly the entire range of vote propensities. 
The table also shows that the low-propensity 
voters One Arizona successfully engaged were 
significantly more likely to vote than the low-
propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima 
County who were outside of One Arizona’s 
target universe (see column e). However, 
the high-propensity voters One Arizona 
successfully engaged were significantly less 
likely to vote than the high-propensity voters in 
Maricopa County and Pima County who were 
outside of One Arizona’s target universe. 
Vote Propensity
a
Engaged
b
Not 
Engaged
c
Not Targeted
d
a minus b
e
a minus c
4 of 4 67.8% 64.4% 81.9% 3.4%*** -14.1%***
3 of 4 40.0% 36.5% 49.7% 3.5%*** -9.7%***
2 of 4 27.7% 17.8% 24.7% 9.9%*** 3.0%***
1 of 4 21.0% 10.1% 12.4% 10.9%*** 8.6%***
0 of 4 6.3% 1.7% 3.1 4.6%*** 3.2%***
3 of 3 42.7% 40.7 61.3 Ns -18.6%***
2 of 3 26.2% 16.5 23.9% 9.7%*** 2.3%***
1 of 3 15.6% 6.9% 8.1% 8.7%*** 7.5%***
0 of 3 5.9% 1.5% 2.3% 4.4%*** 3.6%***
2 of 2 43.8% 42.6% 60.1% Ns -16.3%***
1 of 2 23.5% 15.6% 22.7% 7.9%*** Ns
0 of 2 6.3% 1.9% 2.9% 4.4%*** 3.4%***
1 of 1 39.1% 26.2% 41.6% 12.9%*** -2.5%***
0 of 1 7.2% 3.1% 4.1% 4.2%*** 3.1%***
0 of 0 24.4% 14.6% 23.2% 9.8%*** 1.2%***
Table 19.  2012 General Election: Voter Categories
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Ns = not significant.
36. For the 2014 general election, “4 of 4” refers to voters who were eligible to vote in the 2006 general election and voted in each of 
the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 general elections. “3 of 3” refers to voters who registered to vote after the 2006 general election, 
but before the 2008 general election and voted in each of the 2008, 2010, and 2012 general elections. This pattern repeats down
to “0 of 0,” which refers to individuals who registered to vote after the 2012 general election, but before the 2014 general election.
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Table 20 shows the overall efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2014 general election distinguishing 
between low- and high-propensity voters. 
For low-propensity voters, the intent-to-treat 
effect is 6.6 percent with a low of 6.3 percent 
and a high of 6.9 percent. The result obtained 
from the instrumental variable method is 
-3.3 percent with a range of -2.9 percent to 
-3.8 percent. As previously mentioned, the 
instrumental variable method is most likely 
an inappropriate measure of efficacy for 
our purposes here given One Arizona did 
not use a random assignment procedure 
to determine which voters to include and 
exclude from their target universe. The 
result obtained from the inverse probability 
weighting method, which to recall adjusts 
for bias using attempted contact, age, sex, 
marital status, and year of registration, is 6.1 
percent with a low of 5.8 percent and a high 
of 6.4 percent. These results are all highly 
statistically significant (p < .000). For high-
propensity voters in Maricopa County and 
Pima County, the results are consistently 
negative across estimation methods.
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2014 general election increased turnout 
among low-propensity voters by a robust 6.1 
percent. Whereas just 16.4 percent of low-
propensity voters in Maricopa County and 
Pima County voted during the 2014 general 
election, 22.5 percent of the low-propensity 
voters that One Arizona successfully engaged 
voted.37 During the 2014 general election, 
One Arizona added 3,782 low-propensity 
voters to the electorate.
Table 21 repeats the analysis but focuses on 
Hispanic/Latino voters. For low-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat 
effect is 13.9 percent with a low of 13.7 
percent and a high of 14.3 percent. The result 
obtained from the instrumental variable 
method is 12.8 percent with a low of 12.3 
percent and a high of 13.2 percent. The 
result obtained from the inverse probability 
weighting method is 13.2 percent with a low 
of 12.8 percent and a high of 13.6 percent. 
These results are all highly statistically 
significant (p < .000). Similar to the analysis 
of all high-propensity voters, the results 
are consistently negative across estimation 
methods when focusing on high-propensity 
Hispanic/Latino voters.
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2014 general election increased turnout 
Low- 
Propensity 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
6.6% <.000 6.3%, 6.9%
Instrumental 
variable
-3.3% <.000 -2.9%, -3.8%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
6.1% <.000 5.8%, 6.4%
Table 20.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
37. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election. 
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among low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters by a robust 13.2 percent. Whereas just 
9.4 percent of low-propensity Hispanic/Latino 
voters in Maricopa County and Pima County 
voted during the 2014 general election, 22.6 
percent of the low-propensity Hispanic/
Latino voters that One Arizona successfully 
engaged voted.38
2.8   2015 Municipal Primary Election    
in Phoenix
• One Arizona made over 100,000 
attempted contacts to nearly 70,000 
unique voters during the 2015 municipal 
primary election in Phoenix. 
• One Arizona’s field program was almost 
exclusively focused on door-to-door 
canvassing.
• During the 2015 municipal primary 
election in Phoenix, One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts increased turnout 
among all targeted voters by 11.1 percent  
(p < .000).
• Focusing on Hispanics/Latinos, the 
data indicate that One Arizona’s voter 
engagement efforts increased turnout 
among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters 
by 17.1 percent  ( p < .000).
The following analyzes the efficacy of 
One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts 
during the 2015 municipal primary election 
in Phoenix (n = 67,074).39  In Phoenix, One 
Arizona made 112,171 attempted contacts 
to 67,074 unique voters. 58.5 percent were 
Hispanic/Latino and 29.8 percent were 
Caucasian.40 Door-to-door canvassing 
comprised nearly all of One Arizona’s 
attempted contacts during the 2015 municipal 
primary election in Phoenix. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 22.3 percent. 
38. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa 
County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election. 
39. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2015 municipal primary elections. Outside 
of Phoenix, One Arizona made 207,929 attempted contacts to 101,334 unique voters. 17.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino 
and 75.2 percent were Caucasian. This is based on 75,542 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during 
the 2015 municipal primary elections outside of Phoenix also focused on door-to-door canvassing. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix was 33.6 percent.
40. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 67,074 voters.
Low- 
Propensity 
Hispanic/
Latino 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
13.9% <.000 13.7%, 14.3%
Instrumental 
variable
12.8% <.000 12.3%, 13.2%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
13.2% <.000 12.8%, 13.6%
Table 21.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy:  Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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Table 22 shows the efficacy of One Arizona’s 
voter engagement efforts during the 2015 
municipal primary election in Phoenix. The 
intent-to-treat effect is 12.5 percent with a low of 
11.9 percent and a high of 13.2 percent. The result 
obtained from the instrumental variable method 
is 7.4 percent with a low of 5.9 percent and a 
high of 8.7 percent. The result obtained from the 
inverse probability method is 11.1 percent with a 
low of 10.4 percent and a high of 11.8 percent. 
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 
2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix 
increased turnout among targeted voters by 
11.1 percent.
Table 23 repeats the analysis, but focuses 
on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/
Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 18.8 
percent with a low of 18.2 percent and a high 
of 19.4 percent. The result obtained from the 
instrumental variable method is 29.2 percent 
with a low of 28.2 percent and a high of 30.2 
percent. The result obtained from the inverse 
probability weighting method is 17.1 percent 
with a low of 16.2 percent and a high of 17.9 
percent. These results are all highly statistically 
significant (p < .000). 
Altogether, these results suggest that One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts targeted 
at Hispanic/Latino voters during the 2015 
municipal primary election in Phoenix 
increased turnout by a robust 17.1 percent.
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
12.5% <.000 11.9%, 13.2%
Instrumental 
variable
7.4% <.000 5.9%, 8.7%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
11.1% <.000 10.4%, 11.8%
Table 15.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
Low- 
Propensity 
Hispanic/
Latino 
Voters
Treat-
ment 
Effect P value 95% CI
Intent-to- 
treat effect
18.8% <.000 18.2%, 19.4%
Instrumental 
variable
29.2% <.000 28.2%, 30.2%
Inverse 
probability 
weighting
17.1% <.000 16.2%, 17.9%
Table 16.  Voter Engagement 
Efficacy:  Latino Voters
*** statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically 
significant at the .01 level, * statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Ns = not significant. 
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2.9   2015 Municipal General Election
in Tucson
• One Arizona made nearly 30,000 
attempted contacts to nearly 20,000 
unique voters during the 2015 
municipal general election in Tucson.  
• One Arizona’s attempted contacts were 
focused exclusively on door-to-door 
canvassing. 
The following analyzes the efficacy of One 
Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during 
the 2015 municipal general election in 
Tucson (n = 19,380).41  In Tucson, One Arizona 
made 28,444 attempted contacts to 19,380 
unique voters. 73.8 percent were Hispanic/
Latino and 21.5 percent were Caucasian.42 
Attempted contacts focused exclusively on 
door-to-door canvassing. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate was 31.4 percent.
41. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Tucson during the 2015 municipal general elections. Outside 
of Tucson, One Arizona made 68,890 attempted contacts to 29,522 unique voters. 16.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino 
and 75.8 percent were Caucasian. This is based on 9,352 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during 
the 2015 municipal general elections outside of Tucson also focused on door-to-door canvassing. The door-to-door 
canvassing contact rate outside of Tucson was 71.1 percent.
42. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 19,380 voters.Race and ethnicity data are available for all 67,074 voters.
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APPENDIX 2:
ONE Arizona Theory of Change
January 2016
Strategies
Short & Intermediate 
Term Outcomes
Long-Term 
Transformative Outcomes
Elected Latino 
leaders are true 
representatives 
of the Latino 
communities
The American 
democratic system is 
more equitable & truly 
represent its people 
across ethnicity, 
race, class, gender & 
orientation
Social sector 
organizations are 
exemplary in solving 
the most urgent 
issues facing Latino 
& other communities 
most in need
Increased political power for Latinos & 
other marginalized communities 
More public & private resources are 
directed to the needs of Latinos and 
the New American Majority
Addressing Latino issues and concerns 
is how politicians and decision makers 
routinely do business 
More social sector organizations adopt 
a coalition culture—to help each other 
grow, less competition
Stronger capacity and social capital 
exist among Latino organizations 
and leaders working together to 
improve conditions in Latino & other 
underrepresented communities
Increased rates of Latino vote share: 
voter registration, PEVL, GOTV, election 
protection, issue advocacy & activism
Latino & other historically marginalized 
communities are taken more serious by 
those in power
Public opinion shifts to see Latinos and the 
New American Majority as an indispensable 
& contributing part of a democratic society
Intentional, organized coalition & social 
sector infrastructure that is disciplined, 
lessen the divides, able to disagree, more 
accountable to each other
Increased capacity in Latino-led 
organizations to combine social services 
with civic engagement
A more robust and dense network of 
Latino leaders and organizations actively 
working together
+
Recruit volunteers, canvassers, conduct training for field 
staff, mobilize constituent base
Mount comprehensive, data-informed field strategies: voter 
ID & registration, door knocks, phone banks, mail, ballot 
chase, precinct walks
Implement targeted communications & media strategies to 
shape public opinion
Integrate sophisticated data analysis programs to 
understand voting patterns —capture dependable votes & 
target low-propensity voters, turnout, gaps
Build the internal effectiveness & capacity of the One 
Arizona Coalition by having transparent & accountable 
decision-making systems in place
Cultivate the leadership of volunteers, rank and file 
staff & grassroots residents to speak up, engage in 
issues, vote for policies that matter to Latinos & other 
underrepresented communities & to run for office
Coalition plays the role of coordination: turf, best 
practices, no duplication & more resources, akin to “land 
sharing,” “growing the pie” vs. everyone out for their own
Effective Field Program
Coalition Building  and
Leadership Development
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